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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Section 13 of the Sale of Land on Instalments Act 72 of 1971 
bore, and its  successor, section 19 o f the Alienation of 
Land Act 68 of 1981 bears, a simple heading: "Limitation of 
righ t of seller to take action."
The law reports  of February 1984 contained three cases of 
enormous significance for parties to contracts for the sale 
of land on instalments. Robinson y Bradfield* and Miller v 
Hall'* passed relatively unnoticed but I became extremely 
concerned when I read the judgment of Flemming J  in Holme 
v  B ardsley.**
It was quite unnerving to discover, within eighty pages of 
each o ther in the law re p o rts , th ree cases with such 
serious implications for sellers of land in terms of such 
contracts; especially in regard  to the calculation of the 
th irty  day notice period required by section 19. Had the 
draughtsman of the Act been guilty of a great 
understatem ent when choosing his heading for the section; 
had he really intended to deprive a seller of his righ t to 
take action against a delinquent purchaser?
As a practising  attorney I was aware of the protection 
innocent purchasers of land on instalments required against
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th e ir own "improvidence and folly"1 in succumbing to the 
temptation of profits offered by  enthusiastic 
commision-hungry land salesmen. The 1960's in South
Africa had seen near hysteria amongst budding property 
tycoons, many hoping th a t by purchasing virgin land on 
instalments they  would, with minimum cash outlay, be able 
to reap large profits with quick resales, often to other 
innocent purchasers who would part with hard  earned cash 
to acquire the property  with the same object in mind. 
There are many instances of land being resold several times 
on instalments before transfer was eventually taken with 
huge profits being made by  all. There are likewise as 
many instances of tragic losses arising from many causes 
including inability or unwillingness of sellers to honour 
their obligations.
On the o ther hand, looking at the situation from the point 
of view of clients who were genuine p roperty  developers, 
and had been such in good times and in  bad, I realised 
that serious inroads had been made by legislation into the 
righ ts of individuals to freedom of contract.
f re -read  the above cases and o thers and came to the 
conclusion that the draughtsman was innocent; the courts, 
in their overeagerness to give the maximum possible 
protection to purchasers at a time when they were in 
breach of their contractual obligations, had extended the
1. Per Mil . J in  Smit and Venter v Fouric and another 
1946 WLD 9 when referring  to the "Hire‘"Purchase Act
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meaning of the sta tu tes  much fu rthe r than could ever have 
been intended.
I decided to write a short note to set out my view that the 
interpretation placed on the sections by the courts was 
incorrect insofar a s  i t  reiated to the calculation of the 
period of notice required  by the sections. I intended to 
publish the note in a commercial publication or law journal 
so tha t unwary sellers of land and their lawyers would be 
aware of the pitfalls o f the law.
Although I began with the predetermined view that the 
judgments were inco rrec t, there were times when I 
questioned whether th is was in  fact so; and so my 
investigations went deeper and the short note grew longer. 
When I was finished (th is introduction was written last) my 
view was unaltered -  I still believe that the p resent state  of 
the law in regard to the calculation of the th irty  day notice 
period required by the sections is  incorrec t. I hope that 
my research  will be of assistance not only to sellers but 
also to lawyers and advocates who may t ry  to set the courts 
on the righ t direction in their interpretation of section 19. 
I have also dealt with o ther aspects of section 19 in regard  
to which the  judgm ents, whilst not always harmonious, do 
not appear to be totally unreasonable.
I am grateful to members of the Johannesburg Bar who have 
given up valuable time to discuss various aspects of the 
sections with me and to those who have made available to
T H E S l/ l /b s
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me unpublished arguments In several cases relating . 
sections.
I am also grateful to counsel for a copy of the unreported 
judgment of O' Donovan J  in Dynnland (P ty  Limited v  U.E. 
Nielsen, 1 which seems to date to be the only judgment 
runn ing  contrary to the prevailing interpretation of section 
19, appreciating fully the significance of changes in the 
legislation. Why i t  remains unreported is a mystery.
The preparation of this tex t has taken many hours of the 
time and patience of J v  Sacks and her I.B .M . word 
processor. She has git uch of her free time to help
me, has been extremely patient with me, and h e r  advice 
and co-operation is sincerely appreciated.
It is  hoped that this dissertation will serve a practical 
purpose. P erhaps, if  the Appellate Division has not yet by 
the publication hereof pronounced finalJy on section 191" my 
research  will assist some counsel in  attempting to convince 
tha t court tha t O' Donovan and Gordon J 4 were correct.
1. Case 21432/81 (W) unreported.
2. Aspects of Section 13 have been argued in Orkin enJn 
ander v  Phone-A-Copy Worldwide (P ty) Ltd 1983 (3) 
SA 881 ( f ) l  Judgment has been reserved.
3. Dynaland v  U.E. Nielsen supra .
4. Who in Koordvaal Konstnaksie Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk 
v  Booysen iW5 (2? T51 (T) appreciated the
differences between section 13 as it  was before and 
after its 1975 amendment and concluded that previous 
court decisions were accordingly no longer applicable.
T H E S l/ l /b s
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION
Before the abolition of slavery in  the Cape Province, 
inasmuch as registration in the slave reg iste r was required 
to tran sfer property in  slaves, sale and delivery of 
possession of a slave, by a person in whose name the slave 
was on the  re g is te r, to the pu rchaser without registration 
effected in the le tte r 's  name, was wholly ineffectual in a 
question with creditors of the seller.^
That principle was not re stric ted  to slaves.
On 13 January  1837 Harris bought a house from Buissinne 
fo r ;21 050,00. He paid £400,00 on account and entered into 
possession of the premises. Before tran sfer could be 
reg istered  in the deeds office, Buissinne became insolvent 
and Harris went to court with the tru stee  in regard  to the 
ownership of the p roperty . It was held th a t, as ownership 
could pass to Harris only by v irtue of registration of 
transfer in the deeds office, he had never become the 
owner of the property and that it  accordingly vested in the 
tru stee  for the benefit of creditors of the insolvent estate .
1, Hanekom's T rustee v Kotze (1829) 1 Menzies 411.
T H E u i/ l /b s
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Harris had acquired nothing more than a jus ad rem and a 
personal claim against Buissinne to convey to him the jus in 
re  by transfer coram lege loci. Harris thus lost both the 
property and the money he had paid on account and was 
left with the cold comfort of a claim against the insolvent
It has been suggested2 tha t the rule laid down in Harris’s 
case3 presupposes that at the time the insolvent agreed to 
sell o r otherwise alienate the property  he had dominium 
therein by v irtue of reg istered  title and tha t the rule can 
ha' e no application in a case in which a t the time of
disposal the insolvent had no actual dominium bu t merely a 
personal righ t to obtain dominium. Accordingly it  is  argued 
that i f  before obtaining delivery the insolvent sells the 
property  (or cedes his righ t to obtain tra n s fe r ) , he 
thereby completely dive- s himself of all his righ ts  with
regard  to the p roperty , and tha t if  he has before
sequestration sold property  of which he has not himself
received transfer (o r has ceded his righ t to obtain 
tra n s fe r) , his tru stee  is bound on receipt of tran sfer to 
pass transfer of the property  to the purchaser (or the 
cessionary) against payment of the purchase price if  not 
previously paid, In this connection reliance is placed on 
Smith v  Farrelly 's T rustee.^ Tnis approach too was
1. Harris v Trustee of Buissinne (1840) 8 Menz 105.
2. Mara The Law of Insolvency in South Africa (7th ed)
at 1791 '
T H E S l/ l /b s
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adopted in Van Aardt v Hartley's T rustees and Britz v De 
ffet, N .O ., en 'n ander.^
The principle enunciated in Harris' case^ resulted in severe 
hardship and it should have been clear even at that stage 
that purchasers of land required  protection. A fter all the 
purchase of land usually in the form of a domestic 
residence, is probably the most important commercial 
|j| transaction the majority of people ever en te r into in their
I
entire lives.
m  Substantial protection has now been given to purchasers by
the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, b u t, for the 
^  purposes of considering i t ,  it  is useful to trace the history
of legislation relating to the saJe of land in South Africa. 
It will be seen that the wheels of justice have turned  very 
slowly and not always fairly to all parties.
At common law a contract for the sale of land, like any 
other sale, does not for its validity require compliance with 
any formality.
The General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957 was the firs t 
statu te to introduce formalities in respect of sales of land 
applying equally in all four provinces. Its  title was "To 
amend the Law relating to formalities of certain contracts".
1. (1845) 2 Mens 143.
2. 1965 (2) SA 131 (O).
3. Supra.
T H E S l/ l /b s
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Prior to the General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957 statutes 
requiring formalities for the sale of land had been 
introduced and existed independently in the four provinces.
In the Cape Province the common law applied until the 
promulgation of the General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957 
bu t there were certain sta tu tes  which made reference to 
m atters affecting sales of land.
Section 8 of Act 15 of 1855 (C) which professed to be "An 
act to amend the Ordinance No. 18, 1844 for regulating the 
paymi-.U " f  T ransfer Duty in  th is Colony", required  a 
purchaser of land to disclose the name of the principal for 
whom he acted, i f  this was the case. O ther sections 
related to transfer duty being payable by  a purchasing 
agent who did not produce his principal’s authority .
Several other amendment acts were thereafter promulgated 
and the T ransfer Duty Consolidation and Amendment Act 5 
of 1884 (C) repealed all the aforegoing. This Act also dealt 
with the purchase of land by agents and required  the name 
of the principal to be disclosed at the time of purchase. 
Unauthorised agents were liable for payment of transfer 
duty. Section 30 rendered a sale of land null and void 
where the purchaser did not profess to act for himself but 
failed to disclose -
"at the time of making and completion thereof 
the name of the principal for whom the 
purchase is  made".
T H E S l/l/b a
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Sec^on 24 provided that In a sale of land by public auction 
there would be no sale until the name of the purchaser had 
been taken down in writing, unless the name of the person 
for whom the bidder was purchasing had been announced 
publicly to the bystanders. The Act makea very 
interesting reading, especially in section 19 relating to 
exemptions frou duty.
Although the common law applied in Natal, as well, there 
were certain applicable sta tu tes.
Law 12 of 1884 (known as the "Statute of Frauds”) provided 
tha t an oral sale of land was not actionable unless 
evidenced by some writing or unless there had been part 
perform ance. This law was partially repealed by the 
General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956 and finally by the 
General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957.
The Act to Amend the Law relating to the Sale and 
Purchase, Act 7 o f 1903, dealt with the sale of land 
through agents not being by public auction, and imposed 
transfer du ty  on unauthorised agents. Parts of this Act 
were repealed by the T ransfer Duty Act 40 of 1949 and the 
remainder by the Pre-Union S tatute Law Revision Act 36 of 
1976.
In the Transvaal the common law applied until the Transfer 
Duty Law 20 of 1895. This provided in section 17:
"No property shall be considered to be 
lawfully sold until a proper memorandum or
T H E S l/l/b s
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declaration has been duly signed by both 
parties."
This Law was repealed by the Transfer Duty Proclamation 8 
of 1902 (T) which contained provisions similar to those in 
the Cape Act 5 of 1884. Watermeyer C.T in Van Wyft v 
Rottcher's Saw Mills (P ty) Limited* commented on section 30 
o f this Proclamation:
" . . .  it seems clear from th j  provisions of the 
proclamation tha t one of the purposes o£ the section 
was to prevent frauds upon the revenue."
In the Orange Free State the common law also applied until 
Chapter LXVII (T ransfer Duty) of the Law Book was 
enacted. This enactment contained provisions similar to 
those in The T ransfer Duty Consolidation and Amendment 
Act 5 of 1884 (C) and T ransfer Duty Proclamation 8 of 1902 
(T ). This Chapter was repealed by the T ransfer Duty 
Ordinance 12 of 1906 (O) which provided tha t no sale of 
fixed property was of any force or effect unless in writing 
and signed by the parties or their agents duly authorised 
in writing. The requirement of disclosure of the name of a 
principal and the liability of an agent for tran sfer duty 
upon failure to make this disclosure was also dealt with.
Innes JA in Wilken v  Kohler,'* referring  to the Transfer 
Duty Ordinance 12 of 1908 ( 0 ) ,  said:
1948 (1) SA 981! (A) at 988.
See also Brink v  Witd 1968 (Z) SA 536 (A) at
1913 AD 135 at 142.
T H E S l/ l /b s
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"Recognising th a t contracts for a sale 
of fixed property  were, as a rule, 
transactions of considerable value and 
importance, and that the conditions 
attached were often intricate, the 
Legislature, in order to prevent 
litigation and to remove a temptation to 
perjury  and fraud , insisted upon 
their being reduced to writing, . . .  I 
am satisifed tha t the provision was 
adopted not for the advantage o f any 
particular class of persons, bu t on 
grounds o f public policy."
I t was clear th a t some form of purchaser protection was 
required. The provisions of section SO of the T ransfer 
Duty Consolidation and Amendment Act 5 of 1884 (C) and 
corresponding sections in legislation in other provinces were 
aimed at discouraging a fraud on the Receiver of Revenue.* 
The principle enunciated in Harris' case'* still applied, and 
any protection which a purchaser of land on instalments 
derived from the existing legislation was only coincidental.
In an attempt to mitigate the hardship on purchasers of 
land on instalments, the Insolvency Act 1916, Amendment 
Act 29 of 1926 introduced section 72 into the Insolvency 
Act 32 of 1916. This section was left unrepealed by the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. It provided tha t a purchaser of 
land, the purchase price of which was payable in 
instalments at specified periods, and who had paid to the 
seller in such instalments not less than 50% of the agreed 
purchase price , was entitled to demand transfer of the land 
on condition that simultaneously therewith he registered in 
favour of the seller a firs t mortgage bond over the land to
1. Diemont AJA in Wendywood Development (Pty) Limited 
v Rteger & Another 1971 (3) SA 28 (A) at 38,
T H B Sl/I/bs
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secure the balance of the purchase price and in terest in 
terms of the agreement of purchase. If the seller was 
unable or failed o r refused to give tran sfer, the purchaser 
was entitled to trea t the contract us cancelled and to 
recover the purchase price together with such damages as 
1-e could prove he had sustained an a resu lt of such 
failure.
Section 72, however, offered little comfort for purchasers. 
F irstly , being for many years the only unrepealed section 
of the Insolvency Act 32 of 19.16, many were unaware of its 
ex istence.1 Secondly, the protection it provided was 
available only after a substantial portion of the purchase 
price (half) had already been paid and whilst the seller was 
not yet insolvent. Yet it  i j  exactly in those circumstances, 
i e when the seller does become insolvent prior to transfer 
of the land to the pu rchaser, that the protection is 
required . There was little else, however, a purchaser 
could do, except perhaps to try  and protect himself 
contractuelly by for instance stipulating in the contract of 
purchase end sale tha t transfer of the land was to be 
paased to him at any time he chose to require this against 
registration of a mortgage bond in favour of the seller for 
the balance of the purchase price then outstanding, 
whatever it was; but until transfer was actually 
reg istered , the purchae-ir would remain at risk .
1. Seo for instance the startling  admission of Hiemstra J 
in Verryne v  Von Zyl and Another 1962 (2) SA 152 
(T ). As Innes JA (as he then was) said in Wilken v 
Kohler supra: "Experience shows that in South African 
legislation, whatever may be the case elsewhere, 
important provisions are sometimes found, like flies in 
amber, in unexpected se ttings."
T H B S l/l/b s
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The T ransfer Duty Act 40 of 1949 came into operation on 
1 January 1950. The prior statu tory  position in respect of 
sales of land o ther than those by public auction, as it  then 
existed in each province, was unaffected thereby . The Act 
was noteworthy as i t  was the firs t s tatu te relating to the 
sale of land which dealt solely with the fiscal aspects 
thereof, leaving formalities and other matters relating 
thereto to other sta tu tes.
The General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1967 came into 
operation on 1 January  1958.
Section 1(1) of the Act provided:
"No contract of sale or cession in respect of land 
o r any in terest in  land (o ther than a lease, 
mynpacht or mining claim or stand) shall be of 
any force or effect i f  concluded after the 
commencement of this section unless it  is reduced 
to writing and signed by the partie s thereto or 
by their . agents acting on their written 
au thority ."
This was the firs t time th a t a provision directed at 
formalities relating to the sale of land was Introduced other 
than for fiscal purposes, as had been the case with prior 
provincial and colonial legislation.
In Wendywood Development (P ty) Limited v Rieger & 
another^ Diemont JA re ferring  to the General Law 
Amendment Act 68 of 1957 expressed views similar to those
1. This was very  similar to the provisions of section 49 of 
the T ransfer Duty Ordinance 12 of 1906 (0 ) and 
section 30 of T ransfer Duty Proclamation 8 of 1902 
(T ).
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of limes JA (as he then was) in Wilken v  Kohler* in
relation to the T ransfer Duty Ordinance 12 of 1906 (O)
when he said:
"Section 1 of the 1857 Act is however designed to 
ensure that in such important transactions as the 
sale of landed property the possibility of dispute 
or disagreement should be reduced to a minimum.
In  order to achieve this the legislature requires 
that the contract be in writing and tha t agents 
who sign the contracts fo r  th e ir principals be 
authorised in writing to sign ."
There followed the Formalities in Respect of Contracts of 
Sale of Land Act 71 of 1969. It contained substantially the 
same provisions as the General Law Amendment Act 68 of 
1957 in regard to sales of land.
The late 1960's brought about a boom in  the sales of land in 
terms of instalment sale agreements. People who had never 
dealt in land suddenly entered the arena hoping to resell 
property  at a huge profit shortly  afte r purchase and v ith  
only a small capital outlay, thus reaping large p ro f its .2 
Apart from the potential problems (of which they were, as a 
re su lt of their innocence, usually unaware) posed for them 
by the contracts in terms of which they acquired the land, 
most of these people were unaware of the fact that their 
transactions would render them liable for taxation -  some 
-ven proudly proclaimed their successes and profits in 
newspaper advertisements on behalf of developers - 
probably at substantial cost to themselves and to the 
benefit of the fiscus.
1. Supra.
2. Many did, but during the late 1970's the market 
collapsed and many suffered losses they could scarcely 
afford .
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At the same time the use of standard forms of contracts 
relating to 'tales of land on instalments became more popular 
and sophisticated, and these contracts, like most standard 
form contracts, provided very  little protection for 
purchasers.
In fact, one usually would find pages and pages of clauses 
all containing protection for the seller and imposing only 
onerous obligations on purchasers. Sadly, fear (often of 
eviction), especially in regard  to flats occupied by such 
persons (often elderly) in respect whereof sectional title 
reg isters were to be opened, and sometimes greed, resulted 
in purchasers signing such contracts despite warnings from 
their legal advisers not to do so. Often they  had no 
option. If they did not buy they were evicted.
Section 1 of the General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957 was 
repealed by the Formalities in Respect of Contracts of Sale 
of Land Act 71 of 1969 ("the Formalities A ct"), which came 
into operation on 1 January 1970. The purpose of this Act 
was to ensure tha t the essential terms of a contract for the 
sale of land, tha t is , the parties, the price and the subject 
m atter, had to be in writing and defined with sufficient 
precision to enable them to be identified without extraneous 
evidence or any patent ambiguity in the description.
The last two mentioned Acts i o the General Law Amendment 
Act 68 of 1957 and the Formalities Act were aimed at 
reducing the areas of dispute re la ting  to sales of land.
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They contained no purchaser protection. Yet, despite 
their avowed aim, they  produced their own spate of 
litigation. In an article on this Act JC de Wet said :1
"'Writing' by itse lf is no guarantee of clarity nor 
does it  have the aura of solemnity it  may have 
had five centuries ago. Even in its  present 
hape, the provision (section 1 of this Act) will 
continue to be a fruitful source of fruitless 
litigation."
Section 30 of Proclamation 8 of 1602 (T) and section 49 of 
the Transfer Duty Ordinance 1906 (O) have been described 
as "those notorious case makers"  ^ and, following the 
prophecy of JC de Wet, section 1 of the Formalities Act has 
continued to be a fru itfu l source of fruitless litigation.
Then, as stated  by Van Rensburg and Treisman:3
"Quite unexpectedly the Sale of Land on 
Instalments Act appeared on the statu te book in 
1971 as Act No 72 of that year";
"the Act was ill-conceived, theoretically unsound 
and poorly dra fted ."
It has been said of this Act:
"Unde etiam vulgare Graeciae dictum 'semper 
aliquid novi Africam adferre1" ("whence it is 
commonly said amongst the Greeks 'from Africa 
always uomes something new '."
1. 1969 Annual Survey 104, Words in brackets are mine.
3. MilJner MA "Lively Prospects for Land Sales" (1959) 76
SALJ 16.
3. The Practitioner's Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 
(2nd" ed) at 1.
4. Van Rensburg and Treiaman op clt at 1.
5. Pliny Natural History quoted in Normans Purchase and 
Sale in South Africa (4th ed by Cl Belcher) bT 125.
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The long title to this Act reads as follows:
"To regulate contracts of purchase and sale of 
certain kinds of land under which the purchase
price is payable in Instalments over a period of
one year or longer, and to provide for matters 
incidental there to ."
The words of Millin J  in Smit and Venter v  Fourie and 
another, * used with reference to the Hire Purchase Act 36 
o f 1942, are apposite also to describe the purpose of this 
Act, He talked of -
" . . . .  the mischief of poor persons being enticed 
into shops and being sold goods of more or less
value at prices which they can ili afford to pay,
and on terms which are harsh  and
unconscionable, and it was intended to give 
protection to such persons against their own 
improvidence and folly,"
According to the law as it  stood in 1971 and prior to the 
passing of the Sale of Land in  Instalments Act Act 72 of
1971 (which will be re ferred  to hereafter as "the 1971
A ct"), a purchaser who had bought land under a contract 
in terms of which the purchase price was payable in
instalments, ran the risk  of losing both the land and any
instalments he may have paid in the event of the estate of 
the registered owner being sequestrated as insolvent or the 
land being sold in execution.2 This often applied 
particularly  to purchasers of residential stands in newly 
established or projected townships. Looking at the 1971
1. Supra.
2. Harris v Trustee of Buissinne supra.
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Act as a whole, it  Is evident from its  terms that Parliament 
intended altering the existing  law insofar as i t  related to 
contracts for the sale of land used or intended to be used 
mainly for residential purposes under which the purchase 
price was payable in  more than two instalments over a 
period of one year o r longer, and where the purchases  was 
a natural person . It is not clear why there was any need 
to prescribe th e  number of instalments or the period over 
which they were payable or why the protection applied, only 
to natural persons. Certainly, the longer the purchaser 
was exposed, the g rea ter his risk ; bu t the need for the 
protection remained the same for all purchasers, whether 
natural persons or companies, and irrespective of the 
number of instalments to be paid and the period over which 
they w. re  to be paid.
The most far-reaching and fundamental changes made by 
the 1971 Act to the position as it  existed prior thereto, 
were thoae contained in section 14. This section was 
designed to safeguard the righ ts of the purchaser in the 
event of the insolvency of the owner of the land or the 
attachment thereof at the instance of a judgment creditor of 
the owner. To th is end section 14 in express terms 
conferred righ ts upon a purchaser which he did not have 
under the existing law and provided him with the means of 
enforcing such rig h ts . The most important of these righ ts, 
and the one th a t m atters most, is that in terms of section 
14(2), read with section 14(3) and section 14(4), the 
purchaser was en titled , in the event of insolvency of the
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reg istered  owner or the attachment of the land, to obtain 
tran sfer of the land upon compliance with the requirements 
o f section 14(3) where there was no mortgage bond over the 
land, or section 14(4) where the land was encumbered by a 
mortgage bond. Section 14 created a legal preference in 
favour of the purchaser in respect of the land and provided 
fo r a particu lar way of realising it  on insolvency or 
execution. Very important too was the righ t created by 
section 20, by which the seller was compelled to have the 
contract recorded by the R egistrar of Deeds in the 
prescribed manner. The effect of the recording was that a 
purchaser, in the event of a subsequent sale in execution 
o r because of insolvency, had a p referen t claim in respect 
of the proceeds of the sale. This claim ranked in 
preference immediately afte r any claim of a mortgagee under 
a bond registered over the land on or before the date of 
recording of the contract, and equalled the amount which 
the purchaser might recover under section 28(1) in the 
event of a termination of tha t contract, o r, if  he was a 
remote purchaser, i e one who had purchased from a person 
(the intermediary) who had previously purchased the land 
bu t not yet received tran sfe r, any amount paid by him on 
behalf of the owner under section 11(1). This section gave 
the remote pu rchaser the righ t to pay his instalments to the 
owner on behalf of the interm ediary.
The 1971 Act was amended by the Sale of Land on 
Instalments Amendment Act 72 of 1972 which consisted only 
of one section. In terms thereof the seller could now
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recover from, and /o r obtain judgment against, the 
purchaser for costs of drawing the contract and transfer 
costs. Amazingly, section 6 of the 1971 Act had by 
implication forbidden th is. In 1975 the Sale of Land 
Amendment Act 49 of 1075 fu rth e r defined certain 
expressions, regulated the required and permissible 
contents o f contracts, made fu rthe r provision for the righ ts 
of purchasers under contracts, prescribed fu rthe r 
requirements for the cession and assignment by the seller 
of righ ts and obligations under a contract, defined the 
circumstances in which the seller could take action against 
the purchaser, fu r th e r regulated certain m atters relating to 
the death or insolvency of the owner o f land under a 
contract and a sale in execution of such land, and also 
provided for other m atters in  connection therewith. In 
1976 yet another Sale of Land on Instalments Amendment 
Act, Act 25 of 1976, introduced fu rth e r amendments relating 
to the righ ts of a purchaser under an intermediate 
transaction, and the circumstances in  which the seller 
could take action against the purchaser. The final Sale 
of Land on Instalments Amendment Act 74 of 1978 amended 
the provisions of the 1971 Act relating to the righ t of any 
person to whom land had been sold in terms of a contract 
to obtain tran sfer of the land when it was attached or in 
the case of the issue of a final order of liquidation or 
sequestration in respect of the rc-gistored owner of such 
land or his estate ,
The effect of these amendments was that some of the more
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serious defects of the 1971 Act were eliminated, but 
stated by Van Rensburg and Treisman:*
"At the same time, some brand new defects 
slipped in . Shortcomings of the Act did not 
extend to its former theoretical foundation only. 
It was really pu t to the tes t when the property 
industry  ran  into difficulties during the mid 
seventies, when it was found severely deficient in 
achieving that which evidently it  had set out to 
do, viz. to protect individual purchasers of fixed 
property  against exploitation by large property 
developing concerns."
One of the greater shortcomings of the 1971 Act was tha t it 
did not state what the consequences of non-compliance with 
the prescribed formalities would be. The resu lt was that 
the "rule" in Carlis v  McCusker^ continued to operate in 
the Transvaal although it had been severely criticised.^ 
The "rule" arose from an obiter dictum by  Innes J  in the 
Carlis1 case. In terms of the "rule" a purchaser who had 
paid portion of a purchase price in terms of a contract 
which was void due to  non-compliance with prescribed 
formalities war not entitled to claim back what he had paid 
unless he wan able to prove that the seller was unwilling or 
unable to perform his p art of the void con trac t.4 Once 
the sailer had given transfer in terms of such a contract 
and the purchaser had paid the full purchase price, neither 
party  could claim back performance on the ground of
1. Op cit at 2-3.
2. 1904 TS 917.
3. For an excellent criticism see the judgment of Baker J
in CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v
Novick 1979 (2) 8A 546 (C).
4. See Wiiken v Kohler supra and Botes And Others v
Toti Deveiopmonf Co7 (P ty) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 205 (T ),
T H B S l/l/b s
851126(18)
PAGE 22
invalidity of the contract. That aspect was not prejudicial 
to either party , both having performed and received what 
they hod contracted for. However, as there was no valid 
contract, a fu rth e r consequence of the "rule" was that the 
purchaser was deprived of his ordinary oedilitian remedies 
and remedies for breach of contract, and accordingly a 
purchaser who purchased in terms of such a contract would 
have no claims for damages arising from defects in the 
property  or from partial eviction from the property .*  This 
was a serious omission in a s ta tu te  which had been 
introduced for the protection of purchasers.
The Development Schemes Bill was published in December 
1976 and was aimed at try ing  to rectify  the situation. 
Fortunately it  went no fu rth e r. According to Van 
R ensburg and Treiaman;2
"It is very  difficult to judge what the effect of 
th is bill would have been, had i t  ever become 
Jew, since it  contained very  few rules of 
substantive law. Its basic approach woe to grant 
extensive powers to the Minister concerned to 
legislate by regulation, and to his officials to 
control by arb itrary  decision."
The Alienation of Land Act Act 68 of 1981 repealed all the 
prior legislation referred  to above including "so much as is 
unrepealed” of the Insolvency A ct, 1916, Amendment Act 29 
of 1926. Was the legislature, like Hiomstra J , 2 also not 
sure of what still remained thereof?
1. Milken v  Kohler supra.
2. Op cit at 2.
3. In V erryne v  van Zyl and Another supra,
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CHAPTER III
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF 
THE ALIENATION OF LAND ACT 68 OF 1981
The Alienation of Land Aot 68 of 1981 (which will be 
referred  to hereafter as "the 1981 Act") was assented to on 
28th August 1981 and the English tex t signed by the State 
President. Its  date of commencement was 19th October 
1982, except for section 26. The latter section was 
amended by section 12 of the Alienation of Land Amendment 
Act 51 of 1983 and, in terms of Proclamation 11148 of 1983, 
came into operation on 6th December 1983.*
The purpose of the 1981 Act Is stated  to be -
"To regulate the alienation of land in certain 
circumstances and to provide for matters 
connected therew ith."
The 1981 Act is divided into section 1 which contains 
definitions and thereafter th ree chapters.
The definition of "alienation'1 in section 1 includes 
transactions of exchange and donation of land or an interest
1. Government Gazette 8919 of 7th October 1983.
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in land, whether the transaction ia subject to a suspensive 
or resolutive condition o r not.*
Chapter I deals with formalities in respect o f  deeds of 
alienation. Section 2(1) provides:
"No alienation of land after the commencement of 
the section shflll, subject to the provisions of 
section 28, be of any force or effect unless it 
contained in a deed of alienation signed by the 
parties thereto o r by their agents acting on their 
written authority ."
The wording of this section is very  similar to the equivalent 
sections of old Transvaal and Orange Free State 
enactments, being section 30 of T ransfer Duty Proclamation 
8 of 1902 (T) and section 49 of Ordinance 12 of 1906 (O).
The requirement of writing for contracts of sale of land was 
retained. It had been originally introduced into prior 
legislation on grounds of public policy and the courto are 
left with no equitable jurisdiction which overrides public 
policy and statu to ry  requirem ents in this regard .^  The 
ps.’ties to the sale may also not waive the requirements of 
the legislation.3
1. The reference to the conditions was intended to 
overcome judgments to the effect that a disposal 
subject to a suspensive condition was not a sale until 
the condition was fulfilled and at most created some 
other contractual relationship. See eg Corondimas and 
another v Badat 1946 AD 548. Corondlmas's case^ has 
been criticised bu t not overruled -  see Tuckers Land 
and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Strydom~19?j 
"(1) SA 1 (A)"
2. Per van Heerdcn J in Meyer v  Kirner 1974 (4) SA 90 
(N) at 97.
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Chapter II of the 1981 Act is headed ’’Sale of Land on 
Instalments". It is  aimed at p rotecting the purchaser of 
land on Instalments by virtue of a contract as defined in 
tV- Act. The re bulatory measures :ontained in this chapter 
can be divided into two categories namely:
1. those aimed at providing the purchaser with full 
information regarding the natu re and content of the 
contract; a id
2 . substantive provisions, some of which attempt to 
control malpractices on the p a rt of sellera, and others 
which attempt to  afford protection to purchasers 
against the consequences o f insolvency of the seller or 
attachment of the property  at the instance of a 
judgment creditor of the owner thereof.
To guard purchasers against their own "improvidence and 
foiiy”* section 29 o f the 1981 Act provides that the waiver 
by any person who has purchased land in terms of a deed 
of alienation of any righ t conferred upon him by the 1981
Act shall be null and void. It may be argued that waiver
would in any _ .-ent not have been possible. ^
Of note in Chapter II are the invalidity of certain contract 
term s;3 provisions required to be contained in a contracti*
1. Per Millin J in Smit and V enter v Fourie and another 
supra.
2. See Meyer v  Kirner and Da Mata v Otto, N.O. supra.
3. section 1"
4. section 6.
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provisions relating to sale of land encumbered by a 
mortgage bond;* provisions relating to transactions where 
the seller is not the owner;2 the calculation of interest and 
limitation of the amounts recoverable from the pu rchaser;2 
provisions for recording of contracts;^ stipulations 
relating to purchaser protection when the land is attached 
or an owner becomes insolvent;5 the relief which the court 
may grant in respect of contracts;6 and the limitation of 
the righ ts of sellers to take action.7
Chapter III contains general provisions, the most important 
being section 26 which imposes a restric tion  on the receipt 
of consideration by v irtue of deeds of alienation prior to 
the e r f  o r unit (included in the definition of land)6 
becoming registrable or the contract having been recorded 
if  such is  required; and section 28, which deals with the 
consequences of deeds of alienation which are void or are 
term inated.
As with previous s ta tu tes ,9 non-compliance with the 
provisions of the 1981 Act renders the transaction a nullity, 
bu t section 28 thereof has been drafted to prevent the 
implementation of the "rule" laid down in Carlis v 
MoCusker*6 and followed in ter alia in Botes and others v 
Totj Development Co (Pty) Limited1* to the severe prejudice
Sections 7 and 9.
Sections 10, 11 and 18.
3. Section 12.
4. Section 20.
5. Sections 21 and 22.
6. Section 24.
7. Section 19.
8. Section 1.
9. eg . Section 17 of 
Act 68 of 1971.
10. Supra.
11. Supra.
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of the purchaser in those cases. The "rule " in Carlie v 
McCusker* had suggested th a t, despite invalidity of any 
agreement, completed performance would not be disturbed; 
yet i t  did not bestow validity on the transaction even in 
those circumstances with the consequences mentioned 
above. Section 28(1) provides that, in the event of partial 
performance in terras o f a contract which does not comply 
with the 1981 A ct, the p a rty  who wishes to resile will be 
entitled to do so. It details the extent of the righ ts of 
recovery which e ither p a rty  will have in such a case, which 
righ ts they wu ,l<f not have had but for the provisions of 
the section. Accordingly, a p a rty  who has received p a rt 
performance under a contract which does not comply with 
the provisions of the 1981 Act will not be able to defeat the 
other p arty 's  righ t to recover performance by tendering to 
perform his part o f the bargain. Section 28(2) provides 
that full performance by both parties will bestow validity on 
the transaction ab initio.
Whilst it  cannot be doubted that there certainly existed and 
still exists a need for pu rchaser protection in regard  to 
sales of land on instalm ents, and the 1981 Act certainly 
provides a great measure of th is, i t  can fairly be said that 
the 1981 Act has created yet another "fruitful source of 
fruitless litigation",* which the legislature, surely aware of 
the dificulties experienced with, and brought ibout by
1. Supra.
2. De Wet JO I960 Annual Survey 104 referring to Section 
1 of Act 68 of 19577"
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previous legislation, could and should have been avoided; 
on the contrary the 1981 Act has with the assistance of 
(m is)interpretation by  some courts* created serious 
procedural difficulties for sellers and other problems 
affecting both sellers and pu rchasers. It has become yet 
another of "those notorious case makers".^
1. See Holme v  Bardsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W) and other 
cases as discussed hereunder.
2. Millner MA loc cit referring  to Section 30 of 
Proclamation 8 of 1902 (T) and Section 49 of T ransfer 
Duty Ordinance 1906 (O ).
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CHAPTER IV
SECTION 19 OF ALIENATION OF 
LAND ACT 68 OP 1981
The 1981 Act has not in clear terms resolved all the 
problems attending the alienation of land. It has also 
raised new ones. If cu rren t litigation is anything to go 
by , the main problems in this regard seem to be focused 
upon sections 2 and 19. The litigation in regard  to section 
2 is  mainly a continuation of that relating to the early 
provincial legislation re ferred  to above. It is  not the 
purpose of this dissertation to deal with that.
I propose to analyse the problems relating to and arising 
from section 19 in the light of exist’ng judgments including 
those relating to section 13. In order to do th is, it  will be 
convenient to analyse the development of the common law 
and legislation as it  existed prior to the introduction of 
section 19 and its  predecessor, section 13 of the 1971 Act.
DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW ANf> LEGISLATION PRIOR 
TO SECTION 19 IN REGARD TO SELLER'S RIGHTS UPON 
BREACH OF CONTRACT
At common law breach of contract by a p a rty  does not 
necessarily give the o ther party  the righ t to cancel the
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contract. Cancellation is  an extraordinary remedy which is 
permitted only for serious breaches of contract where the 
other p a rty  has committed a breach showing tha t he has no 
intention of being bound by the contract. The normal 
remedy available to a party  as a re su lt o f breach of 
contract is enforcement of performance of the terms of the 
con trac t.1 A breach of contract in the form of repudiation 
is material by itse lf and would normally justify  cancellation, 
unless the breach re fe rs , for instance, to an irrelevant 
portion of a severable obligation.^
Accordingly a party  can cancel only "where the breach 
'goes to the root of the contract1 or affects a 'vital p a rt' of 
the obligations or where there is no ‘substantial
performance' . . .  the breach must be so serious that it
cannot be expected of the other p a r ty  tha t he should 
continue with the contract."’*
If the breach consists of a failure to perform  timeously 
(mora debitorls), the creditor can withdraw and cancel only 
where time is of the essence of the contract. The mere 
fact that a date is  prescribed for performance by a party
1. De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg (1978)
at 194 and Van Jaarsveld Suld Afrikaanse Handelsreg
(1978) at 114.
2. De Wet and Yeats op cit at 152; Van Jaarsveld op cit
at 106; Van Rooyen V Minister van  Open bare Werke en
Gemeenskapsbou iffis (2) SA 835 (A ); Tuckers Land 
"and" Development Corporation (P ty) Ltd v Hovis 1985
(1 ) S A 6 4 S 1 a) .  *---------------- ---------  --------
3. Htemstra J in Swartz & Son (Pty) Ltd v Wolmaransstad
Town Council iofir™(2)™SA I  (T) at 4.
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does not necessarily make time of the essence, Something 
more is  required in  respect of moat contracts. In some 
contracts however, for instance between dealers where the 
value and price of performance fluctuates from time to time 
and where from the nature of the contact and the relevant 
circumstances it  appears that the parties placed a high 
premium on timeous performance, time will be of the 
essence.*
A creditor may by  notice of rescission create a righ t to 
cancel and withdraw by making a new demand on the 
purchaser to perform within a stated reasonable period .2
Creditors often experienced problems in proving the gravity  
of a breach of contract and cancellation often became 
difficult. In addition, in  many cases difficulty was 
experienced in serv ing  notices on defaulting parties to 
contracts. Accordingly it  became the custom to insert 
provisions in contracts entitling the creditor to cancel at 
any time if  the debtor committed a breach. This is known 
in systems of Roman origin as a "pactum commissorium" or 
"lex commissoria".2 It has been held that in the absence
1. K err AJ The Principles of the Law of Contract (1980) 
at 352; Greenfield Manufacturers~(TEMBA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Royten Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd 19'?6 (2) SA 
565 (aV  at 5 7 lf tftulligan GA "Mora'' (1952) 69 SALJ 
276.
2. Microutsicos and another v Swart 1949 (3) SA 715(A), 
Wouter De Vos "Mora Debitorfs and Rescission" (1970) 
87 SALJ 304; Basil Wunsh "Mora Debitoris and Time of 
the Essence" (1965) 82 SALJ 463.
3. Van der Kessel Praelectionis (Gonin translation 1967 
3 .1.4.32) and Voet 18.3.1.
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of wording to the contrary, the "lex commissoria" is a 
resolutive condition,* If a contract contains such a term , a 
creditor is entitled, but not obliged, to terminate and 
withdraw, even if  the breach is not material o r re levan t.2 
Sometimes there is no requirement for any notice at all to 
be given to the purchaser to rectify  the breach prio r to the 
seller becoming entitled to cancel the contract; more often 
there is , but to prevent the purchaser avoiding receipt of 
the notice, it is usually stipulated that all that is required 
is  proof of the dispatch thereof. The effect o f such a 
stipulation was referred  to by Nestadt S in SA Wimpy (Pty) 
Limited v Tzouras. 2 The learned Judge said:*
"The contractual provisions dealt with in those 
cases were of course different from those here; 
however the judgments illustra te  the principle 
that where there has been compliance with the 
requirements of a  clause providing for the 
sending of a notice to the address chosen as the 
domicilium At m atters not that the notice is never 
received".
With the development of standard contracts the lex 
commissoria became a usual and expected provision. In
fact, in the case of any contract (w hether for the sale of
1. See de Villiers CJ in Provident Land T rust v Union 
Government 1911 AD 6181
2. Oatorian Prooerties (P ty) Ltd v  Maroun 1973 (3) SAm’Txrar'm. ----- -----  ------
3. 1977 (4) SA 244 (W).
4. Supra at 248.
5. The cases referred  to by the Judge being Lovas v 
Estate Rosenberg 1940 TPD 342 and Muller v Mulbarton 
Gardens (P tv) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 328 (W i
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land or otherwise) in terms whereof performance must be 
made over a period, it  became difficult to locate an example 
where this provision did not appear. Such ra re  cases 
where i t  was absent would usually be those in  which the 
contract was drawn by the parties themselves or by another 
person unaware of the difficulties placed by the common law 
on a creditor in enforcing his i-ights upon default by his 
deb to r.1
From the point of view of the debtor such a clause may 
have serious consequences. If there is  no qualification to 
the clause, the creditor would be entitled, immediately upon 
breach, to cancel, withdraw and perhaps claim forfeiture of 
what had already been performed, either as an alternative 
or in addition to damages, even i f  the breach consisted only 
of a failure to pay one instalment or i f  it  was an immaterial 
o r irrelevant provision. The obligations imposed on a 
debtor in terms o f  modern contracts, which are often 
printed in very small type and in colours which make 
reading very difficult (and in most cases are not read by 
them in any even t), provide ample opportunity for the 
breach by the debtor of terms and obligations which may be 
completely Immaterial or irrelevant and do not fustify 
cancellation by a creditor as a re su lt thereof, certainly not 
without the debtor having an opportunity to rectify the 
b reach .
1. In the light of the court decisions discussed hereafter, 
those difficulties may wall have been preferable to 
those raised by section 19.
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Clearly, therefore, some curbs wore required on the 
contractually imposed draconian righ ts afforded to sellers to 
cancel and claim forfeiture or damages or acceleration, or a 
combination thereof, as a re su lt of any failure by a 
purchaser to comply with his obligations in terms of a 
contract, however immaterial o r irrelevant such failure may
An example of the prejudice which could befall a purchaser 
for the breach of a relatively unimportant obligation appears 
from the case of Mangion v B ernhard t.* The facts in that 
case were that the seller wished to cancel the contract, 
which was for the sale of an agricultural holding, in terms 
of which the purchase price was payable in instalments, the 
purchaser having failed to pay  on due date ra tes 
amounting to a mere R180.15. No demand had been made 
on the seller for such payment by the local authority to 
whom the ra tes were payable. The accounts therefore were 
sent by the local authority to the seller, not the purchaser. 
The court found that in terms of the contract the seller 
would have been entitled to cancel, unless the provisions of 
the 1971 Act applied. No notice to remedy the breach was 
required by the contract. The contract had been entered 
into prior to the coming into force of the 1971 Act which, 
whatever its  deficiencies were, introduced in section 13 the 
righ t to the purchaser to be given notice of a breach prio r 
to the seller being able to terminate the contract. 
Fortunately for Bernhardt the Court accepted that the
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provisions of section 13 were procedural end, following the 
judgment in Curtis v Johannesburg Municipality.1 applied 
the law as it  was at the date of the trial. I t held that 
B ernhardt was entitled to notice, thus giving him protection 
which he did not have or did not contemplate that he would 
have when the contract was entered into. The cancellation 
was therefore bad and Bernhardt retained his property .
Accordingly, several statu tes have for some time required 
tha t despite such a provision in a contract (i e that no 
notice is required to be given to a purchaser prio r to a 
seller being entitled to cancel) a demand nevertheless has
to be made (sent?) prio r to the creditor being entitled to
terminate and withdraw from the contract. The demand is 
usually required not only for the purposes of cancellation 
bu t also where claims for damages or for the enforcement of 
forfeiture or of a penalty or acceleration of payments are 
contemplated.^
Section 13 of the 1971 Act originally read as follows:
"13(1) No seller shall, by reason of any failure 
on the part of the purchaser to fulfil 
an obligation under the contract, be 
entitled to terminate the contract or to 
institu te an action for damages unless 
he has by le tter handed over to the
purchaser and for which an
acknowledgment of receipt has been
1. 1906 TS 308.
2. See for example section 12(b) of the Hire Purchase Act
36 of 1942, section 11 of its  successor, the Credit
Agreements Act 75 of 1980 and section 13 of the Sale
of Land on Instalments Act 72 of 1971.
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obtained, or sent by registered post to 
him at his last known residential or 
business address, informed the 
purchaser of the failure in question and 
made demand to the purchaser to carry 
out the obligation in question within a 
period stated  in such demand, not 
being less than th irty  days, and the 
purchaser has failed to comply with 
such demand.
(2) Sub-section (1) shall not be construed
in such mani.'er as to prevent the seller 
from taking steps to protect the land 
and improvements thereon o : , after 
notice as required by the said 
sub-section, from claiming specific 
performance."
Section 4 (l)(a )  of the 1971 Act originally required that a 
contract contain -
"the names of the pu rchaser and the seller and 
their addresses in the Republic which shall serve 
as domicilium citandi a t executandi for all 
purposes of the contract."
From the wording of the section as above, i t  appears that 
the "purposes of the contract" referred  to in section 
4 (l)(a )  did not include the notice referred  to in section 
13(1). The address to which the notice was to be directed 
was determined in accordance with section 13(1).
In terms of Section 10 of the Sale of Land on Instalments 
Amendment Act 49 of 1975, section 13(1) was substituted by 
the following sub-section:
"(1) No seller shall, by reason of any failure on 
the part of the pu rchaser to fulfil an 
obligation under a contract, be entitled to 
enforce any provision of the contract for the 
acceleration of the payment of any instalment 
of the purchase p rice , to terminate tEe
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contract o r to institute an action for 
damages, unless he has by le tter handed 
over to the purchaser and for which an 
acknowledgment of receipt has been 
obtained, or sent by reg istered  post to him 
at his (last known residential o r business 
address) address required to be stated in 
the contract in terms of section 4 ( l) ( a ) , or 
at his changed address on wKich"~notice ft 
required to be given in terms of section 167 
as the circumstances may req u ire , informed 
tUe purchaser of the failure in question and 
made demand to the purchaser to carry out 
the obligation in question within a period 
stated in such demand, not being less than 
th irty  days, and the pu rchaser has failed to 
comply with such demand."
The preamble to the Act expressed the purpose of the 
amendments to section 13 to be:
"to fu rth e r define the Urcumstances in which the 
seller may take action apaint the purchaser."
Section 4 (l)(a )  was also amended by the Sale of Land on 
Instalments Amendment Act 49 of 1975 by the omission of 
reference to the addresses serving as domicilii citandi et 
executandi for all purposes of the contract. That Act also 
substitu ted  a new section 1 6 , as the previous section 16 
had merely stated tha t notice of change of address in terms 
of section 4 (l)(n ) was to be given in writing and delivered 
or sent by registered post by one p a rty  to another. The 
new section read as follows;
"16. The addresses stated in any contract in 
terms of section 4 (l)(a )  shall serve as 
domicitium citandi et executandi of the 
parties for all purposes of the contract «nd 
notice of a change of such a f  'vess sLch tie
1. Underlinings represents insertions; words in brackets 
represent omissions from existing legislation.
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given in writing and shall be delivered or sent 
by prepaid registered poet by one party  to the 
o ther, in which case such changed address shall 
serve as such domiciliura citandi et executandi of 
the party  who was given such notice."
By virtue of Proclamation R226,1 the amendments came into 
force on the 1st January 1976.
The significance of the changes brought about by the last 
mentioned amendments was referred  to and appreciated by 
Gordon J  in Noordvaal Konstruksie Maatskapy (Edros) Bpk v 
Booysen 2 in the following passage from his judgment:
"Prior to 1975, 5.13(1) of the A ct, dealing with 
the despatch of the notice to the buyer, required 
tha t it  be sent by registered post to him at his 
last known residential or business address. The 
amendment to the section, brought about by S .10 
of Act 49 of 1975, required that it  be sent to the 
domicilium citandi e t executandi stated  in  the 
agreement or as changed by due notification in 
accordance with the provisions of S. 16 of the 
Act. The object of the amendment is to ensure 
greater certainty regarding receipt of the notice 
by the buyer. The authorities quoted in  the 
argument on this section deal with the position 
under the old act which provides for notice to be 
given to the lost known residential o r business 
addres^, and are inapplicable to the facts of this
Unfortunately, these sentiments have n rt been shared by 
o ther courts. Unfortunately too, the learned judge was not 
required to consider when the period of notice commenced 
to ru n , and he did not do so.
1. Government Gazette 4847 dated 19 September 1985.
2. Supra at 197.
S. See too O'Donovan <7 in Dynaland (Pty) Limited v  U.E. 
Nielsen Case 21432/81 (W) unreported.
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Section 13 was again amended by the Sale of Land on
Instalments Amendment Act 25 o f  1976, which merely 
reduced the period of notice required  to be given by a 
seller to a defaulting purchaser* in certain circumstances.
PROBLEMS ARISING PROM SECTION 13 OF THE 1971 ACT 
AND SECTION 19 OF THE 1981 ACT
Two aspects of section 13 of the 1971 Act and section 19 of 
the 1981 Act have c&oated problems for sellers. These ere 
the content of the notice required thereby  and the date on 
which the period of the notice commences to run . As many 
of the reported cases dea2 trtth section 13, in order to 
consider and understand the law as contained in section 19, 
i t  is necessary to deal also with the decisions relating to 
section 13.
WHEN DOES THE THIRTY DAY NOTICE PERIOD
PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 19 COMMENCE TO RUN?
The judgments relating to the determination of this date are 
a nightmare for sellers. In terms of section 19 (and the 
earlier section 13), a seller can elect to hand the notice to
the purchaser personally or send it to him by registered
post. It is only the second method which causes difficulty.
T H E S l/ l /b s
851126(16)
Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd1 seems to be the first 
reported  case on section 13. I t  was held by Gal gut 3 that 
"inform" (as it  appeared therein) connoted that the buyer 
actually receives the notice and tha t the phrase -
'"Not being less than 30 days' lends support to 
the view that the buyer was to . have th irty  days 
in which to purge his default."
T hereafter, and on the same page, Galgut J  said:
"Certainly, in the case where delivery was 
effected by hand, the buyer has 30 days. There 
can be no good reason for suggesting that he 
should have had less time i f  the post is used as 
the method of delivery .1'
Galgut J  had been referred  to the case of Fitzgerald v 
Western Agencies  ^ which dealt with notice required to be 
given by a seller in  terms of section 12 of the Hire 
Purchaser Act 36 cf 1942 prior to  being able to enforce 
certain righ ts  arising from a failure of a buyer to ca rry  out 
any obligation under the agreem ent. The section provided 
that such rights could not be enforced by a seller -
" . . .  unless he has by letter handed over to the 
buyer or sent by registered post to him at his 
last known residential or business address, made 
demand . . .  ."
The similarity between that section and section 13 of the 
1971 Act is obvious. Section 12(b), however, used the
1975 (4) SA 123 (W). 
At 125.
1988 (1) SA 283 (T ).
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r |  "informed11, bu t it  is submitted that nothing tu rn s  on this.
'jl In Fitzgerald's case Steyn J  (with whom MoJl AJ  concurred)
held that whan a purchaser had failed to notify the seller
1 of a change of his address, the seller could comply with the
[m requirement that he make a written demand to the
purchaser, by sending the demand to the purchaser's last 
’|jj known ad d ress .1 Accordingly, even though the purchaser
never received the notice, the seller, having posted i t  as 
>1 required , was entitled to exercise hia rig h ts . Although the
frn Judge did not specifically say so, the resu lt to which he
came necessarily implies that he held th a t the demand had 
!|jj been made by the posting.
fii
I submit however that it  would not be correc t, as was done 
by the C ourt, to apply its reasoning only if  no change of 
address was notified. That fact could not, i t  is submitted, 
change the meaning of the section. The time of making of 
the demand cannot alter depending on whether or not notice 
of change of address is given to a sellflr.
Galgut J  in any event was unimpressed by Steyn J 's  
judgment. He was of the view that all tha t Steyn J had 
held was that posting to the last known address was an 
effective method of giving the notice. He overlooked the 
fact that Steyn J could never have held the seller to be
1. Supra at 291.
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entitled to succeed unless he had also held that demand, as 
required by the Act, had been properly made. As the 
notice had never been received by the purchaser this could 
only have occurred upon posting.
Gal gu t's  judgment was not approved by Shearer J  in 
Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) L td,1 in 
which section 13(1) of the 1971 Act in its  original form was 
considered. Shearer J  held2 tha t the significance of 
the word "inform" in the section in its  context was that it 
described the content of the notice -  i t  must, he said, 
"inform the purchaser of the failure in question", and make 
"demand to the purchaser" to remedy i t .  He came to the 
conclusion th a t:2
"the period stipulated in the notice for the 
purchaser to remedy his default commences in the 
event that the notice is  posted by registered 
post, from the date of posting";
and thereafter th a t:4
" . . .  the section clearly . contemplates the 
possibility that the notice may not ever be 
received by the p u rc h ase r ."
Kumleben J In Caldwell v Savopouios^ agreed with Shearer J  
and also held that posting by certified mail would not be 
compliance with the section.
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On appeal the judgment of Shearer J  was reversed by the 
Appellate Division in Maharaj v  Tongaat Development 
Corporation (Pty) Limited, 1 where Wossels JA, who 
delivered the judgment of the Court, based his rejection of 
the judgment in the court a quo on seven considerations.2 
These, it  is  submitted, are mainly concerned with the 
equities of the case. There is , reg rettab ly , no detailed 
analysis of the legal principles involved, nor any detailed 
reference to , or consideration of, many relevant cases.
Much space is devoted in the judgment to the -lature's 
intention, and Wessels JA expressed the legislature’s 
concern:"*
"that the purchaser should personally 
be apprised of the alleged default and 
should, moreover, be accorded the full 
benefit of the period within which he is 
required to remedy i t."
Accordingly he held that to enable the seller to exercise his 
righ ts arising upon a breach of contract by the purchaser, 
the purchaser must receive the notice (or have it made 
available to him at an address where he is  likely to be 
placed in  possession thereof) either by hand delivery or by 
registered post. He held this for the following reasons:
(a) The legislature 's intention in enacting section 13(1) 
was to afford reasonable protection  ^ to a purchaser
1. 1976 (4) SA 994 (A).
2. At 1001.
3. At 1001,
4. Underlining is mine.
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who by reason of a failure on his p a r t to fulfill an 
oblig'ation under a contract faces a th rea t by the seller 
to terminate the contract or to institu te an action for 
damages.
(b) The legislature prescribed reg istered  post as a method 
whereby the seller was required to send a le tte r, as 
th is method is invariably employed for sending 
important letters through the post and that whilst such 
le tters  no doubt do go astray , there is at least a high 
degree of probability that most of them are delivered.
(c) The date of posting and date of deliver, of a 
registered le tte r can be readily established.
(d) As the section required the letter to  be sent to the 
purchaser at his last known residential or business 
address, as opposed to the address chosen ae 
domicilium citandi et executandi in terms of the 
contract, th is emphasised the fact that the legislature 
intended that the le tte r should reach the purchaser 
o r, at least, be made available to him at the address 
where he is likely to be placed in possession thereof. 
I f  the question of delivery of the le tte r was in issue, 
evidence that it  was delivered would constitute prima 
facie p r  i f  of delivery to the addressee, the 
pu rch aser ,1
1. This factor is , It is submitted, extremely important 
when considering the in-, vpretation of the present 
section 19.
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(e) In case of non-delivery the letter would be returned  to 
the sender,
(f) The period of th irty  days could not ru n  from the date 
of posting; as this would lead to uncertainty in that 
the date of the lette r is not necessarily the date of 
posting and because postmarks are sometimes not 
clearly decipherable. It was important for the 
purchaser to know when the th irty -day  period 
commences to ru n . He would have certainty t f  it  ran 
from receipt by him of the letter.
(g> It is  open to the seller to take steps to verify whether
delivery has been effected. He will then be able to 
know when the period mentioned in the lette r expires.
The correctness of this iudgment is doubted. The 
reasoning of ti,e learned Judge is unconvincing and clearly 
basud on equitable and not legal principles; b u t, applying 
the criteria mentioned above, the learned Judge could quite 
as easily have reached the conclusion that tho termination 
was valid. In any event the reasoning does not justify the 
conclusion to which the Court came. Thu reasoning is also, 
as I shall attempt to show, inconsistent. I deal seriatim 
with each of the seven reasons given by the learned Judge 
for his decision:
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Ad (a)
It is correct that the object of section 13 of the 1971 Act 
was (and it is conceded that this too is the object of 
section 19 of the 1981 Act) to ensure that a defaulting 
purchaser of land in terms of a contract, as defined in the 
1971 Act, was provided with the prescribed notice prior to 
entitling an aggrieved seller to exercise his remedies 
resulting from the default; but the steps expected to be 
taken by a seller in giving (sending) the notice can only be 
those which are reasonably practicable.1 In fact, 
Wessels JA accepted that it  was intes dxiJ to give the 
purchaFf'r "reasonable protection" only.2 Was this not 
ensured by choice of hand delivery or registered post for 
transmission of the notice and of the last known residential 
or business address as the address to which the notice was 
to the directed?^ The concept of "reasonable protection" 
however is not consistent with the finding of the learned 
judge tha t the notice must reach the purchaser or have it 
made available to him. It is not clear when, i f  the latter 
test is  applied, the period commences to ru n . When is the 
notice "made available" and by whom is this to be done? In 
any event this first "reason" of the learned Judge is  merely 
a statement by him of his interpretation (correct, it  is 
submitted) of the legislature 's intention and not a leason 
for his conclusion as to the meaning of the section.
1. See the judgment of Kuraleben J  in Robinson v 
Bradfield 1984 (1) SA 349 (D).
2. At 1001.
3. See reasons (b) and (d) of the learned Judge supra.
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Ad (b)
It is  the high degree of probability that registered letters 
are delivered which can equally support the conclusion that 
the period of th irty  days should commence to ru n  from the 
date of posting. After all, os the learned Judge said in his 
firs t reason, it  is only  "reasonable protection"1, which it 
was intended to confer on the purchaser. Furthermore, 
had it been intended by the legislature that the period of 
notice was to run  only from receipt of the notice by the 
purchaser (o r , perhaps when it was made available to him), 
the method of transm itting the notice would be irrelevant 
and it would not have been necessary for the Act to 
provide the permissible methods for doing th is. The seller 
would, in such event, irrespective of the mode of 
conveyance used for the notice, have to prove that he had 
"informed" the purchaser of his failure and the demand to 
make i t  good. On the basis of the majority judgment in 
Swart v  Vosloo  ^ (also delivered by Wessels JA) and that of 
Galgut J  in Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (P ty) Ltd*1 (the 
la tte r being approved by Wessels JA), it  is submitted that 
i t  would be correct to argue that the purchaser will not be 
informed unless and until the notice reaches his mind, 
irrespective of when the lette r containing it is  received by 
him or made available to him, and this would be the case 
whether the lette r reaches him by hand o r through the
1. ibid.
2. 1965 (1) SA 100 (A).
3. Supra.
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post. This would be the necessary interpretation of the 
cases read together. That i t  would be impossible in most 
cases for the seller to determine when the notice reaches 
the purchaser's mind was appreciated by Kumleben J  in 
Robinson v Bradfield* although he re ferr 1 only to delivery 
of the notice to the purchaser and not to its reaching his 
mind; but if the seller would have difficulty in determining 
the former, how much more difficult would the la tte r be? 
Weasels JA said in Sw arfs'* case:
"A person making a written declaration would
ordinarily be a completely sterile activity unless it 
were addressed to some person or persons. A 
person who makes a written declaration would
normally have in mind some other person who is 
to read it . . .  "
It is  true  that Sw arfs case involved consideration of the 
word "declare", bu t it  is submitted th a t the reasoning
therein could apply equally to section 13 (and section 19). 
It is submitted that the choice by the legislature of
registered post as a means of transm itting the notice and 
the high degree of probability (acknowledged by  Wessels 
JA) that most of such le tters  are delivered, actually 
supports the contention that the th irty  days commences on 
ooating.
I t is  correct tha t the date of posting and delivery of a
1, Supra.
2. Supra at 113.
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registered letter can readily be established, but in view of 
the judgment in Swart v  Vosloo* that receipt of a letter 
does not necessarily mean receipt of the notice by the 
addressee, this reasoning is  irrelevant. It is tru e , of 
course, as was stated by Wessels JA that proof of delivery 
of the lette r may raise a presumption that it  was received 
(read) by the purchaser. This however is a purely 
evidential provision and, as was held in the la tte r case, 
was not well founded. On the reasoning o f Wessels JA in 
both cases,^ to entitle a seller to enforce his righ ts he 
would have to prove that the purchaser received and read 
the notice. In the Court a quo in Maharaj v  Tongaat 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd'* Shearer J  held , 
contrary to the finding of the Appellate Division (but it  is 
submitted, correctly), that the date of receipt of the letter 
is not so readily or speedily ascertained whilst the date of 
dispatch of i t  is easily ascertainable by both the seller and 
'.he purchaser; by the seller because he was responsible 
for sending it and is reminded of it  by the post office slip 
in his possession, and by the purchaser who may observe it 
on the postmark of the le tte r. If the postmark is illegible 
(th is does not often happen) the purchaser can ascertain 
the date of posting from the post office. Shearer J  fu rthe r 
said in regard to section 13:*
1. Supra.
2. Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
1976" (T) SA 314 (D) supra and Swart v  Vosloo supra.
3. Supra.
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"In any event the section clearly contemplates the 
possibility th a t the notice may not ever be
received by the purchaser. Once the seller has 
sent it  by registered poat, he has done all that 
the jegisiature has required him to do. The
address is not to be his actual address but his 
’last known residential o r business address' 
whatever tha t may be. It is gravely unlikely that 
it  was intended th a t, when providing for the 
effectiveness of a properly addressed and 
informative le tte r, which goes astray  in the 
post o r for some other reason does not find 
the purchaser, the legislature should at the
same time be concerned with the date of
receipt of one which did not go as tray ."
Ad (d)
Following the judgments of Wessels JA in Swart v  Vosloo* 
and in Maharaj's case,2 delivery of the le tte r of demand to 
the purchaser would in itse lf not be sufficient. Presumably 
the words "last known" in section IS referred  to the
knowledge on the p art of the seller. What if  the purchaser 
had moved and the seller was unaware of this? What duty 
was imposed on him to ascertain such an address? 
C ontrary to the views of the learned Judge, it  would have 
been much better for the purchaser i f  the notice was 
• aired to be addressed to his domicilium citandi et 
executandi over which he had control. In such event the 
purchaser would not have to re ly  on knowledge by the 
seller of his last known address. But then , if  the notice 
commencus to run  only upon receipt thereof by the
purchaser, what really is the relevance of the address to
which it is sen t. It must be remembered that in the light
1. Supra.
2. Supra.
11
1
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of the judgment of Weasels JA in Swart v  Vostoo* the notice 
must reach the mind of the purchaser to be effective, and 
"receipt" should be in terpreted  in this light. The seller 
would in any event have to prove receipt. I f  one holds (as 
Wessels JA did) th a t the notice commences to run  only on 
its  receipt by the purchaser, then that is when it 
commences. If the purchaser never receives it ,  it  never 
commences to ru n . This would be an intolerable situation 
for a seller and could never have been intended by tne 
legislature. Counsel for the purchaser in Maharaj'a case 
had suggested in argument in the Appellate Division that 
the choice of the purchaser 's  last known residential or 
business address as the address to which the le tte r was to 
be directed instead of to the chosen domicilium, supported 
the argument that the legislature intended the notice to run  
only from receipt thereof by th j  purchaser. This argument 
was accepted by the co u rt.2 It Is important to bear th is in 
mind when construing the meaning of the section after its 
amendment in 1975 and of section 19 in the 1981 Act which 
required that the le tte r be addressed to the domicilium 
chosen by the purchaser.
The fact that in the case of non-delivery the letter would 
be re turned  to the sender is irrelevant and is not a reason
1. Supra.
2. Supra at 1001.
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for arriving at the conclusion that receipt of the notice is 
the criterion; 11 would be a consequence thereof.
Ad (f)
The certificate of posting of the registered article issued by 
the postal authorities reflects the date of posting. If the 
date stamped thereon la illegible, the authorities will be 
able to ascertain the information from their records relating 
to the certificate of posting "tjhich bears an Identifying 
number. It would be a simple matter for the puruhaser to 
ascertain th is . It has however been suggested in Miller v 
HaU1 that his could resu lt in prejudice to the purchaser, 
for by the time he ascertained the date of posting some of 
the th irty  days would already have passed . This argument 
is  not tenable. The period of th irty  days is extremely 
generous. It seems to have been forgotten by all that the 
situation being considered is one where the purchaser has 
committed a breach, usually the resu lt of failure to make a 
payment. The purchaser surely knows the terms of the 
agreement, what he must do in terms thereof and what he 
has failed to do. He will usually be aware of the extent of 
his breach. I f  not, he can enquire from the seller as to its 
exact nature . In any event the cases'* require substantial 
details of the breach to be contained in the notice.
1. 1984 (1) SA 355 (D).
2 . See the cases mentioned hereunder.
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It will not always help the seller to know when the 
reg istered  le tte r was delivered. In &r.y event, why should 
he have to go to the trouble of ascertaining when it is 
delivered. Certainly he can ascertain th is, but this will 
not enable him to determine when the addressee was 
"informed" or "personally apprised" or when the notice 
reached his mind. It is  common knowledge that th ird  
parties often accept delivery of registered articles for 
o thers, and some delay may occur in them being passed to 
the addressee. He may never receive them. In any event, 
even if  it  is  received by the purchaser, the letter may lie 
around without him reading it immediately or at all. On the 
basis of the judgment o f  (Vessels JA in Swart v  Vosloo1 the 
purchaser would have to read the le tte r to set in  motion the 
calculation of the period. The difficulty arising from this 
reasoning is  tha t the seller will have no idea when the 
purchaser was "informed" or "personally apprised" or when 
the notification reached his mind, and will have no certainty 
as to when he can commence action. This is solely within 
the knowledge of the purchaser. That th is problem existed 
was acknowledged by Kumlebcn J  in Robinson v  Bradfleld ■ ^  
Although the learned judge followed the Appellate Division 
judgment in Maharaj'i' case (incorrectly and suprisingly, 
bearing in mind the amendments to the 1971 Act and his 
judgment in Caldwell v Savapoulos3) , he held that the
1. Supra.
2. Supra.
Supra.
a
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seller could not in the written notice specify the actual 
commencement of the notice period as this would -
"be an impracticable task in as much as he 
does not know on w hat. date the registered 
le tte r will be delivered”.
I t is submitted that i t  is not correct to suggest, es has 
been done by the courts,^  tha t the two alternative methods 
for transm itting the le tte r both contemplate receipt of the 
letter by the purchaser personally. The method of personal 
delivery does, b u t, for reasons stated  above, posting, even 
by registered post, does not. Furthermore, if  proof of 
receipt of the notice by the purchaser is required , why was 
it  necessary to prescribe the address to which the le tte r is 
to be posted whilst the handing over personally could 
apparently be effected anywhere? If proof of receipt is 
available, why should the seller not be entitled to enforce 
his righ ts simply because such receipt may have taken place 
pursuant to delivery by ordinary post or certified post** or 
at an address other than the domicilium chosen b> the 
p u rch aser .4 The prescrib ing  of the mode of conveyance 
and the address to which the notice is  to be directed, it  is 
submitted, supports the view that the period commences to 
run  ftom date of posting.
1. The learned judge seems to have overlooked the fact 
that section 19 does not require the seller to specify 
when the period is to commence. This comment by the 
learned judge is however important when one enquires 
how the seller is to determine when the notice period 
expires ao that he can institute action.
2. See eg (Vessels J  A in Maharaj's case supra.
3. Caldwell v Savopoulos supra.
4. Noordvaal Konstruksie Maatskappy (Bdms) Bpk v
Booysen 1979 (2) SA 193 (T ).
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It must not be forgotten that in the absence of statutory 
intervention our law recognises the common law freedom of 
parties to a contract to stipulate that upon a breach thereof 
by any one of them the contract is  to terminate forthw ith,1 
o r that the defaulting party  is entitled to notice to remedy 
the breach, in which event they may agree also on the 
period of the notice and when It is to commence.2
The effect of section 13(1) was to modify the common law, 
and it must accordingly be rcstrictively in terpreted .^
The section expressly referred to a "sending", that is the 
method of dispatch. If i t  had so desired the legislature 
could have used the word "delivery" or "receipt".
Accordingly, it  is  submitted tha t the decision of the 
Appellate Division in Maharaj'e case was incorrec t, and that
i f  i t  were correc t, it  no longer applies in view of the
amended legislation.
On 18th May 19704 a d raft bill heauvH "fSate of Land Act
1979", whose object was "To regular- and amend the law
relating to disposals of Land; and to provide for incidental 
m atters", was published.
1. Gordon v Tarnow 1947 (3) SA 525 (A).
2. See eg  United Bioscope Cafes Ltd v Moseley Buildings
Ltd 1924 AiT 60 and Muller v  Mulbarton Gardens (Pty)
l t d  1972 (1) SA 328 (W77
3. Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen's T rustees 1909 TS
4. Government Gazette 6450 (Vol 167).
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Eventually in 1981 the 1971 Act emerged under a new title 
"The Alienation of Land Act No. 68 of 1981" the preamble 
whereof read aa follows:
"To regulate the alienation of land in certain 
circumstances and to provide for matters 
connected therewith."
What was previously contained in section 13 of the 1971 Act 
now appeared substantially in section 16 which, afte r its 
amendment in 1983,^ reads as follows:
"19. Limitation of righ t o f seller to take action
(1) No seller is , by reason of any breach
of contract on the p a rt of the
purchaser, entitled
(a) to enforce any  provision of the
contract for the acceleration of the
payment of any instalment of the
purchase price or any other
penalty stipulation in the contract;
(b) to terminate the contract; or
(c) to institu te an action for damages,
unless he has by  le tte r notified the
purcl. ser of the breach of contract
concerned and made demand to the
purchaser to rectify  the breach of
contract in question, and the purchaser 
has failed to  comply with such
demand.
(2) A notice referred  to in subsection (1)
shall be handed to the purchaser or
shall be sent to him by registered post 
to his address re ferred  to in section 23 
and s> ain -
1. The preamble to tne amending Act (Act 51 of 1983), 
s tates its  purpose in ter alia to be "to effect certain 
textual improvements to section 19."
2. Subsection (1) amended by s 8(a) of Act 51 of 1983 by 
the substitution of "notified" for "informed".
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(a) a description of the purchaser's 
alleged breach of contract;
(b ) a demand that the purchaser 
rectify the alleged breach within a 
stated  period, which, subject to 
the provisions of subsection (3), 
shall not be less than 30 days
calculated from the date on which 
the notice was handed to the 
purchaser or sent to him by 
reg istered  post, as the case may 
be; and
(c) an indication of the steps the 
seller intends to take if  the alleged 
breach -of contract is  not
rectified.
(3) If the seller in the same calendar year 
has so handed or sen t to the purchaser 
two such notices at intervals of more
than 30 days, he may in any
subsequent notice so handed or sent to 
the purchaser in such calendar year, 
make demand to the purchaser to carry  
out his obligation within a period of not 
less than seven days calculated from
the date on which the notice was so 
handed or sent to the purchaser, as 
the case may be.
(4) Sr.l>$ection (1) shall not be construed in 
such a manner as to prevent the seller 
fro,; taking steps to protect the land
:• provements  thereon o r, without 
or afte r notice as required by the said 
subsection, from claiming specific
performance."
Tho 1983 amendments were probably a somewhat belated 
consequence of the decision Hamid and another v
1. Para (a) substitu ted  by s 8(b) of ,\ct 51 of 1983 by 
the substitution of the words "purchaser's alleged 
breach of contract" for the words "obligation the 
purchaser has failed to fulfill'1.
2. Para (b) amended by s 8(b) of Act 51 of 1983 by the 
substitution of the words "rectify the alleged breach" 
for the words "fulfill the obligation”.
3. Para (c) amended by s 8(b) of Act 51 of 1983 by the 
substitution of the words "alleged broach of contract" 
and "rectified" for "obligation in question" and 
"fulfilled" respectively.
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Cassim^ where it was held by Coetzee J (with Le Grange J  
concurring) that a distinction was to be made between 
positive and negative obligations and that no notice was 
required to be given before cancellation in the case of a 
breach of a negative obligation ie the obligation to refrain 
from doing something (non facere).
It is clear from the wording of the section that it  is 
essential tha t a demand from a seller to a buyer must be in 
the righ t form and must be given in the correct manner,2 
and that a failure to comply with the formalities prescribed 
by the section for demands can have serious consequences 
for the seller.2
The wording of section 19 brought forth the folloiyjng 
comments:
"In the light of the clear wording of the present 
section 19(2)(b) the .aforementioned judgments 
will no longer be followed"'
1. 1978 (2) SA 102 (T) t i  105.
2. See in ter alia Holme ,• flurdsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W) ro
the calculation 5? .:hs th irty  day notice period;
Robinson v B radfiW  1984 (1) SA 349 (D) re demands 
sent at in tervals 'o? mire than th irty  days; Porteous v 
Strydom NO 1984 f SA 489 (D) re  incorrect
calculation of over'*-.. ."rount; Miller v  Hall 1984 (1) 
SA 365 (D) re  spn*- h " lion  of steps a seller intended 
to take and inoorr1- 1 •■•t.itutory reference; Caldwell v 
Savopoulos 1976 (&.- i.A 741 (D) re  invalidity of notice 
sent by certified t.-oet, These cases are dealt with in 
detail later.
3. See cases re ferred  to in immediately preceding 
footnote.
4. Maron v  Mulbarton Gardens (P ty) Ltd 1966 (1) SA 106 
(A) and Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd 1376 (4) SA 994 (A).
5. Van Rensburg 6 Treisman op cit at 206.
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and that -
"a notice which is sent in  the prescribed manner 
to the purchaser's address as it  appears in the 
con tract, o r if  his address has changed since 
then , to hie latest address of which he has given 
notice in terms of section 23, will be effective in 
everyi respect even if  It does not reach him
Alas, those predictions, expressed in November 1983, have 
not been fulfilled.
The firs t reported judgment on section 19 is  that of
Grosskopf J  in Oakley v Bestconstructo (P ty) Ltd. 2 He 
held in ter alia th a t:-
(a) although section 19(2) was intended to give a
purchaser greater protection than its  predecessor;
(b ) care should be taken not to impose on the seller a 
greater burden than the legislature had intended; and
(c) the provisions of section 19 were very  onerous and
had to be restrictively in terpreted .^
In Oakley's case the period of the notice did not arise for 
consideration.
Z. Van Rensbui'g * Treisroan op d t  at 202.
2. 1983 (4) SA 312 (T).
3. See too Hamid & another v Cassim 1978 (2) SA 102(T)
and Johannesburg Muncipallty v Cohen's Trustees
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Although the wording of section ID d iffers in several 
material respects from that of section 13, and although 
there are o ther material differences between the two acts 
relating to notices, Maharaj* soldiered on, and in several 
cases2 the judgment of that court in  regard to the 
calculation of the th irty  day notice period was followed.
In his book'* Flemming HCJ had said:
"Orotreut berekening van die aanvangspunt van die 
aanmaningsperiode toon beide artikel 11 van die 
Kredietooreenkomstewet en artikel 19 van die 
Grondvervreemdingswet met voldoende duidelikheid 
dat die periode nie van aanvimgs van die aanmaning 
loop nie (behalwe v ir sover dit met oorhanding 
saamval) maar vanaf oorhandiging of versending.
Dio idee was vermoedelik dat selfs met stadige 
aflewerir.g h  periode van 30 dae genoeg kans vir 
herstel van kontrakbreuk gee al is die paz-tye ver 
van mekaar af. Besliaaings wat h ander 
gevolgtrekking handhaaf omtrent vorige wetgewig ie 
derhalwe onderskeibas.*."
This is  irreconcilable with his views expressed earlier in 
the same work* that the notice period commences to run 
only from receipt thereof by the addressee.
In Holme's case® Flemming J  had the opportunity to elect 
which of the views expressed by him in his book were
1. (The Appellate Division judgment) su p ra .
2. See in ter alia Holme v Bardsley, Robinson v  Brad field
(supra) and Sher s  v tiroo k e 'T .E . 198f (2) PH A64
(W).
3 Kredlettransaksies (1982) at 319,
4. At 318,
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correct. Unfortunately he held tha t the notice commenced 
to ru n  only upon receipt thereof by the purchaser. This 
was despite his acknowledging that the legislature would 
probably have realised that:
"there -ire circumstances where a seller doing his 
utmost nevertheless cannot actually reach the 
buyer personally to hand over a demand or cause 
a registered le tte r to actually reach a purchaser",
and that such an in terpretation of section 19 would be 
unfair to the seller. He did not suggest what the seller 
was to do in such circumstances, although hi his book'1 he
"Vir die verbru iker wat nie meer by sy 
keuse-adres is nie of wat weier om geregistreerde 
stukke van die poskantoor te ontvang sal die 
praktyk waarskynlik die aanknopingspunt in die 
Maharaj saak benut om die aanmaning as 
voldoende te handhaaf slhoewel die bewoording 
van die huidige wette nie steun v ir so "n uitleg 
gee nadat die wetgewerabedoeling dat ontvangs 
van die aanmaning nodig is , blyk nie."
Although Flemming J held® that
"the absence of an equity safety valve, if  that is 
the case, tends to strengthen  the argument that 
the legislature, in fa irness to the seller would 
have intended tha t the posting of the demand is 
adequate",
he continued:®
"The weight of tha t consideration is  lessened by 
the fact that the legislature had a basic stake 
between unfairness towards the seller where there 
is 'impossibility' -  generally the exception ra the r
1. K rediettransaksies (1982) at 319.
2. Holme's case supra at 431.
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than the rule -  and the unfa irness, perhaps also 
mostly in exceptional cases, of a purchser finding 
his contract cancelled because the lette r was not 
delivered."
Although he conceded that a purchaser, realising from the 
postal slip from whom a le tte r emanated, might not bother 
to collect i t ,  he held th a t:1
"The existence of Section 19, 9 context, and its
general t. nor and object, indicate protection to the 
buyer even at the price of some prejudice to the
and (astonishingly) that the differences between that 
section and its  predecessor were not material and that the 
period of notice commenced to run  only when the written 
notification was received.
It is conceded that the intention of the legislature was to 
afford a measure of protection to the purchaser and to limit 
the r ig h ts  of the seller. The latter is stated to be the 
intention of the section; bu t i t  was not necessary to hold 
tha t as a corollary to the reasonable protection^ intended 
for the purchaser, the legislature had in mind prejudice to 
the seller.
With respect to Flemming J ,  and even assuming that 
Wessels JA® correctly  decided the law as it  was then, it  is 
submitted that he erred  in the following respects:
1. ibid.
2. Per Vi .els JA in Maharaj's case supra.
3. In Maharaj's case supra.
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(a) in overlooking the fact that the intention of the
legislature was to afford the purchaser only reasonable 
protection1 and not to guarantee that the notice 
actually cornea to the attention of the purchaser;
(b) in equating the "sending" of the demand to the
"receipt" of the le tte r. If any confirmation is required 
that those words have a different meaning, one need 
look only a t section 7 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 
1957 and also to dictionary definitions;2
It will be remembered tha t in his book Flemming J had 
said2 that i f  the legislature intended "sent" to mean 
"forwarded" or "posted" i t  could have used another
word instead. But is th a t not exactly what i t  does
mean? In that case, why should it  have used another
word. Surely that argument would have been valid if
the legislature had intended to connote anything other 
than the natural meaning of the word. If the 
legislature had intended It to mean "received" it  would 
have used another word, presumably "received" 
itself. It could simply have said "within 30 
days of receipt of notice". The two words 
"sent" and "received" connote stages at extreme 
ends of the journey of the notice; "sent" at
1. Per Wessels J  A in Maharaj's case supra.
2. See eg Shorter Oxford Dictionary "send" means 
"chiefly to dispatch"; *to cause to go"; Concise 
Oxford Dictionary "order or cause to go"; "bring 
about conveyance of".
3. Op cit at 432.
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its  commencement and the o ther "received" at its  
destination. How can the same word possibly mean
(c) in  holding that the purchaser could not be adequately 
protected without necessarily prejudicing the seller;
(d) in not placing enough emphasis on the fact that in 
terms of section 19 the letter is  now to be addressed 
to the address referred  to in section 23 -  which is to 
be the domloiliuiti citandi e t executandi chosen for all 
purposes under in trac t by th s purchaser and
which may be - . • from time to time by the
purchaser -  whilst ... terms of section 13 i t  was to be
addressed to Tiis las t known business or residential
address. In fact he appears to have considered this
insignificant. It will be remembered that in the 
Appellate Division in  Maharaj's case,* the fact that the 
notice was required to be directed to the last known 
business and residential address and not to a chosen 
domio'Jium citandi et executandi was used as the fourth 
reason in support of the finding that the notice period 
started  to run  when the notice was received. On this 
basis it  may well have been that if  section 13 as 
considered in Maharaj's case had required notices to be 
directed to a domicilium citandi et executandi, Wessels 
JA would have come to a different eoncusion.
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Certainly his fourth reason for his judgment would no 
longer have applied. It is clear tha t (as in fact 
happened in Holme's1 case) the registered le tte r may 
never bo received by the purchaser. The onus is 
now, in terms of section 19, read  with section 23, of 
the 1981 Act, on the purchaser to select from time to 
time an address to wftch his mail is to be directed. It 
is submitted that whether he does or does not receive 
i t  is irrelevant according to the 1981 Act as i t  stands. 
The seller has no control over the address. It may be 
a place where the purchaser will never receive a 
letter; he may in fact select it  expressly for that 
purpose, i e to ensure that he will never receive i t . 
J t may be a vacant stand . In such a case, what is  a 
seller expected to do? Is he to be completely without 
remedy? The seller is obliged to send the notice to 
that address to constitute an effective demand if he 
chooses the post as the means of conveyance, even if  
he knows the purchaser is not there or has by letter 
addressed by ordinary post indicated another address 
to which he wishes letters to be d irec ted .2 Section 
19, read with section 23, requires th is. Once the 
to tter is  sen t, the calculation of the th irty  day period 
should be pure arithmetic. It was contemplated by the 
legislature that letters addressed to the domicilium
1. 1984 (1) SA 429 (W).
2. Noordvual Konstruksie MetatskappY (Edma) Bpk v 
Booysen 1979 (2) SA 193 (T ).
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citandi et exeeutandi may not reach the purchaser,* 
but registered post was prescribed as the method for 
postal conveyance in view of its  reliability;^
(e) in not holding that the words "calculated from the date 
on which the notice was . , .  sent to him by registered 
post . . .  " were intended to indicate that the
calculation of the notice period commenced on sending 
(posting by registered p o s t). In fact he seems to 
have attached no significance a t all to these words, 
which did not appear in section 13. The Appellate 
Division in  Maharaj's** case was forced to decide when 
the period of notice was to commence only for the 
reason that the 1971 Act as it  then stood did not 
specify th is. Had the words "calculated from . . . "
appeared in the section then considered, it  is
submitted tha t the problems would never have arisen.
Flemming J ,  wher considering the differences between 
sections 13 and 19, overlooked judgments such as that 
in R v Siailane,'* where Schreiner JA said:
"It is a general rule in the construction of 
statu tes that a deliberate change of 
expression is prime facie taken to import a 
change of intention."
1. See Shearer J  in Maharaj v  Tongaat Development
Corporation (Pty) Ltd l9<8 (1? SA 314 (D) and,
although not referring  to the section, Nestadt J  in SA
Wimpy (Pty) Limited v Tzouras 1977 (4) SA 244 (W).
2. Wessela JA in Maharaj v  Tongaat Development
Corporation (Pty) Ltd 19?6 (4) SA 994 (AjT
3. Supra.
4. 1959 (2) SA 448 (A) at 452.
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(f) in adapting the meaning of "sent" to fit in with the 
meaning he ascribed to section 19(1). There can be 
no doubt that he was of the view that in terms of the 
ordinary meaning of section 19(2) the notice would 
commence to run on posting. He sa id :1
"Unless the reference to a le tte r 'sen t1 in
S .19(2) is in conformity with what I
understand 8.19(1) to convey, it  would now 
also be correct to calculate the 30 days of 
the demand from the date of forwarding the 
lette r instead of the date of receipt thereof."
This was after he had ascribed a meaning to "sent" to 
in terp ret section 19(1).  ^ Then, having done so, he 
again in terp rets "sent", but now in terp rets it to 
be in conformity with what he understood section 
19(1) to convey. It will be seen, therefore, that 
because of his preoccupation to afford maximum
possible protection to the purchaser, Flemming J was 
forced to disregard what he too interpreted to be the 
clear and obvious meaning of section 19(2). He simply 
says that if  it  was intended by "sent" to connote 
"forwarded" or "posted", other words would have been 
used. As stated above, this is not tenable.
I agree with the views expressed by Vorster® that 
the word "sent" in section 19(2) is not so ambiguous
1. At 432.
2. Vorster JP "Die Boperking van die Verkoper se Regte 
in die Geval van K ontraktebreuk deur die Koper by 
die Verkoop van Urond op Afbetaling" (1985) 48 
THRHR at 88.
3. Vorster JP op cit.
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that the question as to whether the notice must reach 
the purchaser can be answered solely by reference to 
"notified" in section 19(1). The fact tha t it  does not 
reach the purchaser cannot alter the fact that i t  was 
"sent". The primary meaning of "sent" does not 
contemplate "receipt".
It has been suggested^ that the only ambiguity ic 
between the use in the English tex t of section 19 of 
the word "notified" and of the phrase "kennis gegee 
het" (transla ted  as meaning "given notice") in the 
Afrikaans te x t, whereas one would have expected the 
use of the phrase "in kennis gestel bet". The 
Afrikaans terminology, Vorster suggests, does not 
contemplate that the notice must reach the  purchaser, 
whilst the English tex t "notified" does. He suggests, 
however, th a t, notwithstanding the signature of the 
English tex t, before it  can be given prio rity  one must 
ascertain whether there is  an irreconcilable conflict 
between the two tex ts.
It may be probable, he says ,2 that the unsigned text 
better reflects the intention of the legislature.®
1. Vorster JP op clt.
2. Vorster JP op c it.
3. Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette (6th edition uitg  deur SIE
van Tender) (1961) at i42 and New Union Goldfields 
Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1950 (37 8% 
392 (A) at" 406.
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Applying those principles, says V orster, one concludes 
that "gestuur11 or "sent" in section 19(2) are not 
ambiguous. The ordinary meaning of the word does 
not contemplate that what is sent must reach the 
addressee. That the ordinary meaning of the word 
"sent" is  intended is shown by the reference in section 
19(2)(b) to the fact that the period commences to run 
"on the date on which the notice . . .  was sent to him 
by registered post".
Although "notified" in section 19(1) may contemplate 
receipt of the notice, in view of the word "sent" in 
section 19(2), its  use may indicate that that aspect of 
the meaning of notified which implies that the notice 
must reach the purchaser should be regarded as 
surplusage;^
(g ) in holding that a purchaser to whom a demand was 
posted should not have less time to remedy his breach 
than one to whom it was delivered by hand. The 
answer to this is that the legislature surely was aware 
that registered letters are usually delivered within two 
or three days after being sen t, and considered that 
even this would leave sufficient time for the purchaser 
to cure his defect. Generally, very  few letters are 
hand delivered, and it must have been contemplated
1. Van der Heever JA in New Union Qoldfields Ltd v
Commissioner For Inland Revenue supra.
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tha t registered post would be the more commonly used 
method of transmission of the demand. Furthermore, 
th irty  days is an extremely generous period for 
rectification of a breach.
It must not be forgotten tha t in most cases the 
pu rchaser would be aware of the breach -  after all it 
re su lts  from a failure by him to comply with his 
contractual obligations.
Van Rensburg and Treisman* also are of the view that a 
notice sent in the prescribed manner to the address chosen 
or altered in terms of section 23 will be effective even if  it 
does not reach the purchaser. This, they say, follows 
from the provisions of section 23 which make i t  peremptory 
for a party  to give written notice of a change o f  address. 
The case of Fitzgerald v  Western Agencies2 is cited aa 
authority for this proposition.
Section 23 reads as follows:
"23. The address stated in any contract in terms 
of section 6 (l)(a )  shall serve as domicilium 
eitandi et oxecutandi of the parties for all 
purposes of the contract, and notice of a 
change of such an addreas shall be given in 
writing and shall be delivered or sent by 
registered post by one party  to the other, 
in which case such changed address shall 
serve as such domicilium eitandi et 
exei tandi of the party  who has given such 
notice,"
1. Op cit at 202.
2. Supra.
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Whilst the conclusion of the learned authors is correct, I 
submit that their reasoning is not. Section 23 does not 
oblige a purchaser to notify a change of address; it  only
prescribes the manner in which it must be done in order to
be effective. As was decided by Gordon J  in Noordvaal 
Konstruksie Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk v  Booysen* strict 
compliance with the requirements o f section 13(1) of the 
1971 Act is essential to a seller's cause of action for relief 
contemplated therein, and accordingly a notice of change of 
address given in a manner other than by registered post 
can be disregarded by a seller as i t  does not amount to a 
formal notification of change of address. In this case the
letter by the purchaser to the seller had been sent by
ordinary post and had read as follows;
"Bit sal waardeer word indien u my met h 
volledige s taat kan voorsien. Geliewe alle
korrespondensie na bogenoemde address te rig ."
Gordon J held tha t a notification of change of address had 
to be sent by registered post, and said:^
"The Act seeks to eliminate, as far as possible, 
disputes about posting and receipt of the notice."
And in regard to the amendment requiring the notice 
to be directed to the domicilium citandi ot executandi 
he continued:3
1. Supra.
2. Supra at 196.
3. Supra at 197.
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"The object of the amendment is  to 
ensure g reater certainty  regarding 
receipt of notice by the buyer."
He then held that the authorities quoted, which dealt with 
the section before its amendment, were accordingly 
inapplicable.
I t is submitted that Gordon J was correct in holding1, that 
the cases decided under the 1971 Act, as it  originally read, 
were inapplicable afte r the amendments brought about by 
the Sale of Land on Instalments Amendment Act 49 of 1975 
to sections 4 (l)(a )  and 18 of the 1971 A ct. It is significant 
that although he was not pertinently called upon to address 
his mind to the question of whether or not the buyer was 
required to actually receive the notice, the above quoted 
passage in which he spoke about eliminating disputes about 
posting and receipt indicates that he did not think th a t it 
was essential for the seller to prove that the notice was 
brought to the attention of the buyer. It is submitted that 
he did not regard the period as commencing only on 
receip t; otherwise what would be the relevance of ensuring 
certainty of receipt?
The point really is that the seller must send the notice to 
the address for the time being selected by the purchaser as 
his domicilium citandi et executandi.
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As previously mentioned, in the Maharaj case 1 Weasels JA 
stated, as the fourth reason for his judgment, that the fact 
that the letter was to be sent to the "last known residential 
o r business address" (o f the purchaser), which would not 
necessarily be the same address as that chosen as the 
doraicilium, was an indication that the legislature intended 
that the le tte r should reach the purchaser. Implicit in  this 
is th a t, i f  the letter was to be sent to a chosen domicilium, 
it  would be contemplated tha t it  might not reach the 
purchaser, and presumably, therefore, i f  the section had 
read as i t  now does, namely that the letter is required to 
be directed to the domicilium, Wessels JA would have 
arrived at a different conclusion. It will be remembered 
that one of the amendments to the 1971 Act, introduced in 
1975, was to require notice to be sent to the domicilium 
chosen by the purchaser instead of to the last known 
business or residential address. Section 19 of the 1981 Act 
is  the same in th is respect.
The 1975 amendment to the 1971 Act was effected prior to 
both Maharaj judgments,^ bu t the section as considered 
therein was the section in its original form. When the 1981 
Act was passed, the legislature must have been aware of 
the judgments and must be taken to have intended a 
meaning o ther than that which the Courts had arrived at 
based on section 13(1) as i t  existed in the 1971 Act. It 
must have intended to meet the very  problem which was
1. Supra at 1001.
2. Supra.
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caused by the earlier judgment. As Hefer JA stated in 
John Gerard Anthony Leydn NO v Noord-Westelike 
Kooperatiewe Landbou Maatskappy Bcperk and Others* when 
referring  to an interpretation of the Co-Operative Societies 
Act 29 of 1939 -
" . . .  word die wetgewer geag op hoogte te wees 
met die stand van die toepasiike re g sp rsak .. .  n
This is , it  is submitted, supported when one bears in mind 
the fourth reason of Weasels JA in the Maharaj judgment^ - 
he heid that the choice of the las t known residential or 
business address as opposed to  the domieilium as the 
address to which notices were to be directed emphasised
"the notice should reach the purchaser, o r , at 
le a st, be made available to him at the address 
where he is likely to be placed in possession 
thereof".
Section 19 of the 1981 Act prescribes to what address the 
notice must be sen t, 1 e to the purchaser's domieilium 
citandi et executandi, being the address stated  in the 
contract in terms of section 6 (l)(a )  of the 1981 Act. The 
purchaser in terms of section 23 is given the righ t to 
change th a t address. It  is now clearly within the control 
of the purchaser to control the address to which a notice is 
to oe directed. It is common knowledge that domicilii for 
various reasons very often do not reflect the current 
address of a party  and that that party  may have omitted,
1. 1985 (2) SA 769 (A) at 781. See also R v  Siaiiane
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intentionally or otherwise, to inform his creditor of a 
change in his domiciltum. A domicilium may even be a 
vacant piece oC land. It may be an address where the 
purchaser will never receive a le tte r or may never intend to 
r  • 'Hve a letter. Surely it  can never have been the 
legislature's intention that the purchaser, by moving from 
the domicilium chosen by him, o r by choosing a domicilium 
such as a vacant piece of ground or one where he would 
not for any other reason receive the le tte r, could deprive a 
seller of his remedies. To hold that would be to give the 
purchaser fa r more than the reasonable protection envisaged 
by Wesseis JA in Maharaj's  case.1 The effect of choice of a 
domicilium was considered by Nestadt J  in S.A. Wimpy 
(Pty) Ltd v  Tzouras. 2 He said:
" . . .  the judgments illustrate the principle that 
where there has been compliance with the 
requirements of a clause providing for sending of 
a notice sen t to the address chosen as the 
domicilium it matters not that the notice is never 
received.n
On the basis of the judgment in Maharaj's  case and that in 
Holme's^ case, a seller could find that if  his purchaser had 
disappeared he could never give the prescribed notice and 
could never terminate the contract o r exercise other 
remedies requiring notice. Surely the legislature, however 
far it  intended to go, could never have intended to go this
fa r.
1.
2, supra.
3. Supra,
4. Supra.
i
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I accept, as was stated by Flemming J , 1 tha t section 19(2) 
deals with formalities, such as the contents of the letter 
and method of conveyance, but why was it  necessary to 
prescribe at all the methods of conveyance of notice or to 
state when the notice period commenced to run  if  it  was 
intended that the period would run only from receipt of the 
notice by the purchaser? All that would have been 
necessary was to say that the alleged breach had to be 
rectified "within 30 days of receipt of notice".
If the onus is on the seller to prove when the notice was 
received by the purchaser, does it  really matter how the 
notice was given?
Flemming held that section 19(2) was ambiguous. He 
pointed out that section 19(2) refers to "a notice referred  
to in s s ( l ) " ,  yet the English tex t of the Act does not refer 
to a notice. He surmises (without justification, i t  is 
submitted) that the Act was originally drafted in Afrikaans 
where both subsections re fer to notice, and that the 
English version merely reflects the mirror image of the 
Afrikaans. The ambiguity, he says, arises as followsz In 
one sense a le tte r (which he views as the notification) is 
"sent" only i f  it  reaches the addressee; otherwise it 
remains a letter which the writer attempted to send. In 
this regard  he sa y s ;3
1. Holme v Bardsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W).
2. Supra.
3. Supra at 432.
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"Ordinarily one cannot say that the seller has 
'informed' the purchaser or 'made a demand1 if 
the true  facts are tha t he attempted to inform the 
purchaser but the attempt failed for some reason. 
Section 19(2) is  concerned with the content of the 
letter and the method of conveyance thereof and 
is accordingly subsidiary to  the major premise 
contained in section 19(1). Accordingly the 
attention may henceforth be directed towards 
19(1)".
In view of the ambiguity in section 19(2), says Flemming J , 
the natural meaning of the words in section 19(1) must take 
preference.
He concluded:^
"What remains is predominantly an area of simi­
larity , in particular in regard to the pattern of 
the lo=islatlor. and of s  19 itself; the object of a 
provision such as s 19 and the policy underlying 
the creation o f such a limitation on the rights of 
the seller; and a similarity in the crucial ques­
tion of whether a lesser measure of protection for 
the purchaser was intended in regard to a lette r 
sent by post than in regard  to a letter handed 
over to the purchaser (which concededly he does 
not now have to acknowledge). Having regard  to 
such considerations and the reasons stated in the 
Maharaj case I am of the view that a similar 
conclusion must be reached in regard to s l9 ."
I submit that the in terpretation of Shearer J  in the court a 
quo in Maharaj's^ case is to be p referred . He held that the 
word "inform" as used in section 13(1), in Its context, 
described the content of the notice; i e it  must 
"inform the purchaser of the failure in question" 
and "make demand" to the purchaser to remedy it.
1. Supra at 432.
2. Supra.
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The section as considered by Flemming J in Holme’s case 
still used the word "inform". Although by then the Act 
had already been amended by substituting " notify" for 
"inform" Flemming J made no reference to it  -  not that he 
had to for the purposes of that judgment.
Boshoff J  In Muller v  Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd*1 had
dealt with the effect of the choice of a domicilum citandi et
executandi by a party  to a contract. He interpreted the 
contract which he was considering as entitling the seller to 
post the notice to the chosen address. He said:2
"If this construction of clause 12 is correc t, then 
the postal address was the address to which a 
notice under clause 10 had to be sent and it was 
sufficient for the respondent to have posted a 
registered letter to that address warning the 
applicant that the contract would be cancelled in 
term ' of clause 10 i f  the outstanding instalments
were not paid within seven days, and it was
immaterial whether the applicant received it on 
the same day as ,th e  le tte r of cancellation, . . .  or 
not at ail . . .  ."
It is submitted that the fact tha t the selection of a 
domicilium is imposed by statu te cannot affect the effect 
thereof.
In Maharaj's case Wessels JA had found that the judgment 
of Boshoff J4 was unhelpful as it  concerned a section which 
used the words "within seven days of the posting". That
1. 1972 (1) SA 328 (W).
2. At 333. See too Nestadt J  in S .A . Wimpy (Pty)
Limited v  Tzouras supra.
3. The underlining is mine.
4. In  Muller v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd supra.
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has, it is submitted, the same meaning as "within seven 
days of i t  being sent by post” and would have been of 
assistance.
The judgment of Rumleben J  in Robinson v Bradfield1 is 
surprising . Despite having, in Caldwell v  Savopoulos2 
approved the judgment of Shearer J  in Maharaj’s case and 
despite being aware of the differences between section 13(1) 
of the 1971 Act as originally promulgated, and as i t  read 
after amendment in 1975, he failed to follow the cautionary 
rules expressed in Sisilane'a2 and Leyd's  ^ cases and to 
seize the opportunity of resta ting  his earlier views. He did 
not even refer to his earlier judgment. All he had to say
"The amendment to the subsection substituted 
another address, but the decision in the Maharaj 
case still applies. The notice period runs from 
the date of delivery at such address."
He did not comment on the significance of the fact that 
whereas Weasels JA in Maharaj's case had emphasised the 
fact that the lette r in question was required to be sent to 
the last known business or residential address of the 
purchaser, it was now required  to be sent to a domicilium 
chosen by the purchaser. It must be noted that
Kumieben J used the word "delivery" and did not direct his 
attention to the "receipt" of the notice by the purchaser. 
As we have seen, "receipt" and "delivery" need not be 
simultaneous®. This shows how loosely the words are used
1. Supra. 4. Supra.
2. Supra. 5. Swart v  Vosloo supra.
3. Supra.
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and in terpreted . Notwithstanding his findings mentioned 
above (i e that the decision of the Appellate Division in 
Maharai's case still applied), Kumleben J found that the 
seller was not obliged to specify the actual commencement or 
expiry date of the notice. He conceded, * quite correctly 
it  is submitted, that th is would be:
" . . .  an impracticable task  in as much as the 
seller does not know on what date the registered 
le tte r will be delivered), nor does the subsection 
enjoin him to state in the lette r -  as it  could 
easily have done -  that the 30 days is to run 
from the date of receipt or delivery of the 
registered le tte r" .
In fact the learned Judge should have gone further: 
For the words "receipt or delivery" in the above passage, 
he should (applying the dicta in Swart v  Vosloo ® ) have 
substituted "read by the purchaser" o r "reached the mind 
of the purchaser" or words to tha t effect. That is really 
what Wesseis JA said in Maharaj's case. It is submitted 
that not only would tha t be "impracticable", it  would impose 
an impossible onus on the seller. Kumleben J did not have 
to direct his mind to the date upon which the notice 
commenced to run . Unfortunately he chose not, to do so.
This highlights one of the major problems arising from the 
judgments, including those of Wesseis JA"* and Flemming J.*  
If the judgments are correc t, not only would it be 
impracticable for a seller to specify in the letter of
1. Supra at 352-3,
m. Supra,
3. In Maharaj (A) supra.
4. Holme v  Bardsley supra.
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demand the date from which the notice is to run or when it 
is to expire (as Kumleben J conceded in the above quoted 
passage), but i t  would be similarly impracticable (if not 
impossible) for him to be able to determine when the th irty  
day period has expired so as to enable him to decide when 
legal proceedings can safely be commenced. A factor which 
is  usually within the knowledge of the addressee of the 
letter only, will determine when the notice period expires 
and proceedings can commence. This dilemma for the seller 
would be a logical consequence of the reasoning in the 
judgments referred  to and can never have been intended by 
the legislature.
Grosskopf J  in Oakley v Bestconstructo (Pty) Ltd1 was 
aware of the serious consequences of section 19 and had the 
following to say:
"Daar meet . . .  gewaak word . . .  dat daar nie h  
awaarder las op die skouera van die verkoper 
gelaai word as wat die wetgewer beoog het. Die 
bepalings van a r t  19 is immers beswarend van 
aard en moet dus streng  uitgel6 word."
Unfortunately, he was not required to consider when the 
notice in question commenced to run as he found, for other 
reasons, that it did not comply with the section.
None of the judgments previously referred  to appear to 
have borne in mind the caveat expressed by of 
Grosakopf J . On the contrary each has in fact imposed a 
heavier burden on the shoulders of the seller.
1. Supra.
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The matter came before O'Donovan J in the Witwaterarand 
Local Division in the unreported case of Dynatand (Pty) 
Limited v U.S. Nielson1 which dealt with section 13 of the 
1971 Act after its  amendment in 1975. Apart from the 
judgment of Gordon J in the Noordvaal case2 (which, 
although it recognised that significant changes had been 
made to the 1971 Act, did not specifically decide when the 
notice period commenced to ru n ) , it is the only glimmer of 
hope to date for sellers.
It will be remembered that Weasels JA in Maharaj's case2 
held that the reaaon for the letter being required to be 
sent to the last known residential o r business address was 
an indication that the legislature intended tha t it  should 
reach the purchaser, o r at least be made available to him at 
an address where he was likely to be placed in possession 
thereof. This too was one of his reasons for holding that 
the th irty  day period commenced on receipt of the letter by 
the purchaser o r, (inconsistently, it  is submitted with the 
above) when it Is made available to him at that address. 
O'Donovan J held that the subsequent abandonment (in 
terms of the 1975 amendment) by the legislature of the 
purchaser's laat known residential or business address as 
the address to which the notice must be sent in favour of 
his domicilium citandi et executandi was an indication of a 
compiete change of policy on the p art of the legislature and
1. (Case 21432/81 (W) unreported).
2. Supra.
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that upon a proper construction of section 13(1) in its  
amended form the risk  of non-delivery of a registered 
notice was henceforth to fall on the purchaser. If this was 
correct, held the Judge, the only available date from which 
the period of notice can be calculated is the date of posting 
thereof.* This reasoning becomes even more logical and 
acceptable when one considers the present wording of 
section 19, which specifically says when the notice period 
commences.
The judgments which hold that the period of the notice 
commences to ru n  only when the lette r is received by the
purchaser require that the word "sent" be in terpreted  as
meaning "received". Apart from the difficulties which 
would be caused by Swart v  Vosloo2 in adopting this
interpretation, it involves unnecessary convoluted reasoning 
and is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.
In Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited v 
Clarke^ Holmes JA considered the meaning of the word 
"sent" in section l l (b is )  of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 
29 of 1942. which provided that medical reports were to be 
"sent by registered post or delivered by hand". The
lerrned Judgu held th a t, although the section was
1. It is submitted that the correctness of this view is 
supported by the principles enunciated in Sisilane's 
and Leyris1 onset, and the judgment of Gordon J in the 
Noordvaal case supra.
2. Supra.
3. 1972 (3) SA 508 (A).
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introduced for the benefit of the addressees (as was section 
13 o f +he 1871 Act and section 19 of the 1981 Act), the 
insurance companies, in the context of the statute there 
was no reason for departing from the plain and ordinary 
meaning of "sent" and that such departure would be a 
disservice to clarity . He stated that he was fortified in his 
view by the antithetical juxtaposition of the verbs in "sent 
or delivered", the la tte r referring to manual delivery. He 
then said i1
" . . .  but if  'sen t' is  also to be given the meaning 
of or approximating to 'delivered’ why use 'sent' 
at all. In the result I hold that 'sen t' re fers to 
the date when the documents are despatched in 
the p o rt’';
"On the other hand it is important for a claimant 
to be able to know when he may serve his 
summons, in other words, the exact date as from 
which the period of 60 days begins to ru n . We 
have already held that it runs from the date when 
the le tte r containing the relevant information 
is (i) dispatched (as distinct from delivered) by 
post; o r (ii) delivered manually, as the case may
In the latter event the company is enjoined to 
acknowledge receipt in writing thereof and the 
date of such receipt. Why? Clearly for the 
purpose of providing the claimant with proof of 
the date from which the statu tory  period begins 
to ru n , for the onus is on him to prove the 
expiration of a period of 60 days as from the date 
on which the claim was sent or delivered as the 
case may be before service of the summons. The 
provision ju st mentioned is therefore primarily one 
for the benefit of the claimant. If he elects to 
send the claim by post, he is enjoined to register 
i t . Why? Again primarily to furnish him with
Supra at 515. 
Supra at 517.
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proof of that date, by means of his registration 
s lip , as from which the period of sixty days 
begins to run ."
I submit that ihis reasoning equally applicable to section 
19 and is to be preferred  to that of Weasels JA in 
Maharai's 1 case and Flemming J  in Holme's2 case. It is 
based on the plain meaning of the words used in the section 
and not on artificial reasoning which attempts to 
over-emphasise what has been in terpreted  as being the 
intention of the legislature.
The Appellate Division again considered the meaning of 
"sent" in section l l(b is )  of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 
29 of 1942 in the case of A.A. Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd v Tlabakoe. 3 The majority judgment was 
delivered by Rabie AJA, with whom Van Blerk and Ogilvie 
Thompson JJA concurred. The court held that the sixty 
days commenced, if  notice was sent by registered post, 
upon the posting. Rabie AJA said :4
" . . .  selfs wanneer aanvaar word dat die 
Wetgewer bedoel het om h  voordeel v ir 
versekeraars te skep, dit nie gesA kan word dat 
die bedoeling was dat die tydperk van 60 dae 
inderdaad of in alle omstandighede 60 dae sou 
wees nie. Soos reeuo gesA is , as h  eis per 
geregdstreerde pos gestuur word sal "n 
versekeraar normaalweg minder -  dalk "n hele paar 
dae minder -  60 dae gegun word om die eis te 
ondersoek. Trouena, dit is nie ondenkbaar dat h 
geval horn kan voordoen waar h  eiser sy eis
1. Supra.
2. Supra.
3. 1870 (1) SA 302 (A),
•i. Supra at 314.
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behoorlik p e r  aangetekende poe s tuu r soos die 
Wet van horn vereis en dat dit die versekeraar nie 
bereik nie."
Vermooten AJ delivered the judgment in Sher S v  Crook 
T .E .* He was considering section 19 of the 1961 Act, and 
although he correctly in terpreted  the problem as follows:
"The crisp question to be decided is when the 30 
day period commences to run";
he assumed, incorrectly it  is  submitted, that
"the legislature requires the notice . . .  to reach 
the hands of the defaulting buyer . . .  "
and thereafter, like Flemming J ,^  incorrectly equated "sent" 
to "receive". He said:
"it is clear tha t 'send ' can and does in many 
cases mean 'receive '."
He held that, as the phrase "or sent to him" in the section 
stands in juxtaposition to "handed to the purchaser", it 
tended to connote the achievement of the same resu lt as 
handing over and tha t the legislature intended that the 
expression "sent to him" in section 19(2) must be taken to 
mean "received by him". This is in direct conflict with the 
judgment of Holmes JA.® This casq was not mentioned in 
the judgment and one does not know whether Vermooten J 
was referred  to it -  presumably not. He endorsed the
1. 1984 (2) PH A64 (W).
2. Holme v Bardsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W).
3. Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited v  Clarke
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judgment of Flemming J  In Holme's* case and also referred 
to the cases of R v Thwaltes  ^ and R v Berk'* which are 
discussed below, as well as to section 7 of the 
Interpretation Act 53 of 1957.
The Judge failed to appreciate that Maharaj's** case 
considered section 13 when it did not provide how the time 
period was to be calculated and when the lette r was to be 
directed to the last known residential or business address 
of the purchaser.
The fact that section 19 now .‘pacifically provides when the 
calculation of the period of notice is to commence, in my 
view renders it  unnecessary to invoke, as Vermooten J  did, 
the  provisions of section 7 of the Interpretation Act 53 of 
1957 in interpreting Section 19.
Vermooten J did not attempt to specify any of those "many 
cases" he referred to above. This is not surprising  -  they 
would be very difficult to find. I know that when I send a 
letter someone should receive i t .  If he does not for any 
reason receive it ,  th is does not alter the fact that I sent 
i t . My sending was not unsuccessful, the receipt was. 
One cannot support the judgments of Flemming J or 
Vermooten J ,  unless one adopts a course of contrived 
reasoning to arrive at such a conclusion. The word "sent"
1. Supra.
3. Infra.
4. 1976 (4) SA 994 (A).
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in the section has a clear meaning. Why must one depart 
from this? If the legislature intended it to mean "receipt", 
it could quite easily have said so. The express wording of 
section 18 requires no interpretation and overcomes the 
problems which arose from the original section 13. That 
was, it  is submitted, the contention of the legislature in 
drafting  the present section.
Vermoote-i J  e rred , as did Weasels JA, (although, perhaps, 
he can be forgiven to some extent because of the wording 
of section 13 as i t  then was), Flemming J and others in 
founding their interpretation of sections 13 and 19 mainly 
on the intention o f the legislature as they saw i t  -  namely 
tha t the sections, like the Acts in which they found 
themselves, were intended to protect purchasers and that 
they accordingly had to be construed and extended by the 
courts to give the purchaser protection fa r beyond what 
was contemplated by the legislature. They firs t decided 
that the notice had to be received by (o r a t least made 
available to ), the purchaser, and then in terpreted  "sent" 
accordingly. Why was it  necessary, as Flemming J did in 
Holme's* case, to choose between unfairness to the 
purchaser (he conceded that such would arise only in 
exceptional cases if  the word "sent" was in terpreted  to 
mean "sent") end unfairness to the seller? No choice was
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necessary. Why should the word not have been given its  
ordinary meaning? Before the sections appeared, the only 
protection the purchaser had, for what it  was worth, was 
section 72 of the Insolvency Act 32 of 1916. Sections 13 
and 19 both brought about substantial added protection for 
purchasers -  they were fa r  better off than they were 
before, and there was no need for the courts to extend the 
meaning of the section to the severe prejudice of the seller; 
only reasonable protection was intended to be given to 
purchasers.1
In Sher'a  ^ case Vermooten J  sought support for his view 
that "sent" means "received" in  the judgments in R v 
Thwaltes^ and R v B erk .4 in the la tte r case the 
Ordinance referred  to a notice "served on or sent . . .  " 
within ten. days of commission of the alleged offence. The 
Court held tha t a considerable degree of ambiguity had 
been created and that as the matter related to a criminal 
prosecution i t  had to be interpreted in a manner most 
favourable to the accused; accordingly, the word "sent" 
was in terpreted  to mean "effected" not "despatched". This 
decision is , it is submitted, incorrect. The court, 
approving Thwaite's case, interpreted the section to accord 
with its understanding of the intention of the legislature. 
This is not Justified. The moaning of the section Is clear.
1. Per (Vessels JA in Maharaj's case supra.
2. Supra.
3. 1932 CPD 375.
4. 1958 (1) SA 685 (C).
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If giving "sent" its  ordinary meaning produces an unfair 
re su lt, the legislature, not the courts, must correct the 
matter.
In R v Siltnan* Banks AJ held that Thwaites' case did not 
decide tha t notices sent by registered post muat be proved 
to have been received personally.
Vermooten J  overlooked the judgments of Holmes J A in 
Commercial Union Assurance Company of South Africa 
Limited v  Clarke,'* Smalberger J  in Matroaa v Minister of 
Police and Another,"* Morris v Kietsop and Minister of 
Police4 and Rex v Reynolds,** the la tte r case considering 
the same Ordinance as was considered in Thwaites’1* and 
Berk's  ^ cases. The latter was also a full bench decision 
and related to the identical section considered in Thwaite’s
This section provided that no person could be convicted of 
a contravention thereof unless the court was satisfied that 
.ictice of the intention to lay the complaint had been sent to 
him or handed to him personally within such time after 
commission of the offence , not exceeding seven days, as the
1. 1969 (3) SA 868 (C ).
2. Supra.
3. 1978 (4) SA 79 (E).
4. Case 1428/74 (8 ) unreported.
5. 1933 CPD 581.
Supra.
Supra.
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court thought reasonable. Referring to Thwaites1 case1 
Gardiner JP . who delivered the judgment of the Court, in 
Reynolds1 case 2 said:
"It is  true  that there are remarks in the judgment 
which might be read as suggesting tha t the court 
meant that the notice must be received within 
seven days but . . .  I must regard it as obiter 
dictum. What the court did decide was that the 
notice was to be dispatched in sufficient time to 
be received within seven days. By any remarks 
beyond th a t, I am not bound. I do not think 
that the Ordinance requires that the Crown must 
prove that the accused has received the notice."
I submit that Gardiner JP erred  in his interpretation of 
Thwaites1 judgment, as both judges in tha t case clearly 
in terpreted  "sent" as meaning "received". However 
Gardiner JP correctly interpreted "sent" in accordance with 
its  ordinary meaning.
Other remarks by Gardiner JP are also interesting. In 
Reynold’s case the letter advising of the intention to lodge 
the complaint was returned undelivered because of "the 
insufficient address given by the accused". He held:^
"Now if  an accused gives an insufficient address,
1 do not think he can complain when the 
procedure provided by the Act has not been
1. Supre.
2. Supra.
3. Supra. See too Nestadt J  in S.A. Wimpy (Pty) Limited 
v  Tzouras supra.
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effectively carried out. Take for instance where 
he gives a false address; could it  be said . . .  
that he could claim an acquittal because the notice 
was not received by him. That would be 
absu rd ,n
The same reasoning applies equally to sections 13 and 19. 
Here too the purchaser himself selects the address to which 
the notice is to be sent, and the legislature has provided 
the means of sending it -  by hand or by registered post 
with its  "high degree of probability" of being delivered.^ 
The alternative methods of conveyance were chosen for the 
benefit of the seller. Surely a seller could not be without 
remedy if the purchaser did not receive a letter because of 
a false address chosen as his domicilium (or for any other 
reason). Would it  be necessary, i f  the cases ere correct, 
in such circumstances to apply the doctrine of fictional 
fulfilment? HCJ Flemming suggested:2
"Daar is gevolglik grond v ir die Interpretasie dat 
die aanmaningsvereiste nie geld waar dit volgens 
verkeersmaatstawwe onmoontlik is om na te kom 
nie."
In other words, according to the author (now Flemming J) 
no notice is necessary in terms of Section 19 in such 
circumstances.
de Ja g e r ,3 whilst agreeing with the view o f Wessels JA 
suggests that where the purchaser is to blame for the non 
receipt by not notifying change of address, the time
1. Per Wessels JA in Maharaj v Tongaat Development 
Corporation (Pty) Limited (su p ra ) .
2. Krediettransakaieg (1982) at 318. See too passage 
quoted at page 60 above.
3. Theo de Jager Alienation of Land (1982).
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period should begin to run  when the postal service delivers 
the registered slip o r attempts to deliver i t .
I t is submitted that there is no room for this view or that 
of HCJ Flemming in the above quoted passage. Both are 
suggesting tha t their interpretation of the section would be 
otherwise than the prevailing one if  delivery could not be 
effected for the reasons mentioned. This surely cannot be 
correct. The section can have only one meaning and that 
must apply in all circumstances.
Matross1 case* in  which the judgment was delivered by 
Smalberger J , concerned section 32(1) of the Police Act 7 of 
1958 which provides:
"Any civil action against the state or any person 
in respect of anything done in pursuance of this 
Act, shall be commenced within six months after 
the cause of action arose, and notice in writing of 
any civil action and of the cause thereof shall be 
given to the defendant one month at least before 
the commencement thereof."
Smalberger J  held: ^
"The delivery of the registered slip to the second 
defendant's usual address for the receipt of post 
was akin to placing him in possession of the letter 
to which i t  re ferred , for i t  placed him in a 
position where he could obtain the letter, and 
would in the normal course be expected to obtain 
it  within a relatively short time of the receipt of 
the registered slip";
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"There seems to be no logical reason for holding 
that a different position should pertain where a 
registered slip, not the letter itself, is delivered. 
Registered post is generally regarded as one of 
the safest means of ensuring that a le tte r reaches 
its destination. It would be an absurdity if  a 
person in the position of the second defendant 
could receive a registered slip for a le tte r 
containing a notice in terms of s . 32(1), 
deliberately ignore it  for an indefinite period and 
thereafter  claim that the provisions of s . 32(1) 
have not been complied with".
The court in Matross1 case had referred to the judgment in
Morris v  Kietsop and Minister of Police  ^ (which also
involved a reference to section 32(1) of the Police Act, Act
7 of 1958. In that case Addleson J  said :
"Mr Van Renaburg fairly drew my attention to the 
case of Pease v Minister of Justice 1962 (2) SA 
302 T at 306 from wEIcH It appears, by 
implication, to have been held th a t receipt of a 
notice such as the present one, at the office of 
the person concerned, would constitute a proper 
giving of notice to that person, even i f  he did 
not physically receive it  himself on that date.
To hold otherwise would, in my judgment, open 
the door to a situation whereby the intended 
recipient could delibertately defeat the legitimate 
claim of the plaintiff, by refusing to pick up or 
handle a le tte r which had reached its  appointed 
destination in time, until after the prescribed 
period had elapsed. In my view it is sufficient 
for compliance with the section if , within the 
stipulated time, the notice reaches the place 
where the recipient has directed or agreed that 
this post should be placed. If the lette r reaches 
the defendant's post box well within the period 
required by the section, it  would surely be no 
answer for him to say that he was on leave and 
therefore could not take physical delivery of i t ."
The judges in both the Matross3 and Morris'* cases were
thus aware of the danger in interpreting the section in
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question as requiring actual receipt of the notice by the 
addressee. Was (Vessels JA when referring1 to the notice 
"at least being made made available . . .  " , not also aware of 
this danger?
Certain English cases may, in the present context, be of 
assistance.
In Stanley v Thomas2 the Kings Bench Division considered 
a section of the English Road Traffic Act, 1930. The 
wording of this section was similar to that in the Cape 
Ordinance considered in the Thweitee, Reynolds and Berks2 
cases and provided that a notice of intended prosecution 
had to be "served on or sent by registered post". Lord 
Heivart LCJ said.-4
"It is to be observed tha t the words are 'sent to 
him1, not 'sent to him and received by him'."
He approved, in relation to the statu te he was considering,
the following passage in the judgment of AT Lawrence, J  in
Retail Dairy Co., Ltd v  Clarke:5
" . . .  in the absence of any words in the 
subsection indicating tha t the word 'sen t' is used 
with any other  than its  ordinary meaning of 
'dispatched1 it must bo construed as bearing that 
meaning."
1. In Maharaj v  Tongaat Development Corporation (P ty) Ltd
2. 1939 2 ALL ER 636.
3. Supra.
4. Supra.
5. 1912 2 KB 388.
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The English Road Traffic Act was again considered in
Sandland v Neale* where Lord Goddard CJ said:
"The section requires a notice to be 'sent by 
registered post to him’. I t does not say where.
It does not Bay to the last known address.
Surely no-one could contend that if  it  was sent to 
his ordinary address, the fact that he was away
on holiday would make the service bad; it  is the
sending, not the receipt, as I have already
emphasised, that is material."
The reasoning in all the latte r three cases is simple, sound 
and, with the greatest respect, correct, and is consistent 
with that of Holmes JA in Clarkes' case .2 All the
above-mentioned judgments in South Africa, except that of 
O’Donovan J 3 have applied contriv 1 reasoning to in terpret
"sent" a- meaning "sent to him and received by him" or
simply "received" or perhaps "made available to him",* and 
have given i t  a meaning o ther than its  ordinary meaning.
Ac the law stands at p resen t, what is to happen to a seller 
who sends a notice which is never received by a purchaser, 
whatever the reason for it? It seems that he would have no 
remedy at all. In Holme's** case Flemming J found that the 
le tte r was addressed to the domicilium chosen by the
purchaser and that it  may have been impossible to deliver a 
letter there by registered post. Notwithstanding this he
1. 1955 3 ALL ER 571.
2. Supra.
3. In Dynaland (Pty) Limited v U.E. Nielsen (case 21432/81 
(W) unreported).
4. (Vessels JA in Mahara] v  Tongaat Development Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd (sup ra).
5. Supra.
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found that notice had not been given. It will be 
remembered too that Flemming J acknowledged that a seller, 
doing his utmost, might find i t  impossible to  procure that a 
demand reaches the purchaser -  what is to happen then he 
did not say . Did he intend that the seller would, in those 
circumstances, be without remedy? He said :1
"A true  impossibility of communication with 
the respondent (the purchaser) was in this 
case not factually established ..
Did he intend by this to indicate th a t, if  such impossibility 
could be established, the section would be given another 
meaning or that the notice would not be required?^ It is 
however not the purpose of thid dissertation to consider the 
question of impossibility of perijvmance but it  is  submitted 
that it would be most unfortunate i f  sellers had to resort to 
such legal principles for assistance.
CONTENT OF NOTICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 19(2)
Section 19 of the 1981 Act, as amended by section 8 of the 
Sale of Land Amendment Act 51 of 1983, requires that a 
notice in terms of section 19(1) shall contain
1. Supra at 431.
2. See extract L’om his book Kredlettraa^aksioa (1982) at 
page 92 supra which suggests that h e " was of this
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"(a) a description of the purchaser's alleged 
breach of contract;
(b) a demand that the purchaser rectify  the 
alleged breach within a stated period, which, 
subject to the provisions of subsection (3) 
shall not be less than th irty  days calculated 
from the date on which the notice was 
handed to the purchaser or sent to him by 
registered post, as the case may be; and
(c) an indication of the steps the seller 
intends to take i t  the  alleged breach of 
contract is not rectified .'1
Originally section 13 of the 1971 Act had simply required 
that the seller had by letter:
"informed the purchaser of the failure in question 
and made demand on the purchaser to ca rry  out 
the obligation in question within the period stated 
in the demand . . .  "
The departure from the wording used in the  1971 Act was 
probably, to some ex ten t, prompted by the judgment of 
Coetzee J in Hamid and another v Cassiro,1 where he held 
that the section ai it  appeared in the 1981 Act applied only 
to positive oligations. The notice in question in Oakley v 
Bestconstructo (Pty) Limited^ sent on behalf of the seller to 
the purchaser is an example of a failure to comply with 
several of the requirements of the section. It would in fact 
be difficult to find a better example to illustra te  the 
requirements of the section and its  interpretation by the 
courts. It reads as follows:
1. 1978 (2) SA 102 (T ).
2. 1983 (4) SA 312 (T ).
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"We have been instructed by our client, 
Bestconstructo (Pty) Limited, to advise you as we 
hereby do, that unless we receive your payment 
of the balance of the purchase price still due to 
our client within th irty  days from the date 
hereof, our client will in its  sole and absolute 
discretion act against you in terms of para 9 of 
the deed of sale entered into with you on 14 
January 19(il in respect of the abovementioned 
property".
It was held by Grosskopf J that the notice did not comply
with section 19 in that:
1. the reference to the ’’balance of the purchase i ice" 
was intended by the seller to include all other amounts 
(including rates and taxes) owing under the contract,1 
and the purchaser might have had difficulty in 
calculating the  outstanding balance because he may not 
have known the amount of ra tes  and taxes or the ra te  
of interest applicable at the appi* jr ia te  time;2
2. it  did not itself specify the amount to be paid"* and 
if  the purchaser were required to make enquiries as to 
the amount he had to pay and if  he still had to wait 
for a rep ly , i t  may well be that the th irty  day period 
available to him would be drastically reduced,^ (The 
Judge did not refer to the method of calculation of the 
th irty  day period);
1. At 317-16.
2. At 318-319.
3. At 318.
. At 319.
m : . . -
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3. the respondent's notice did not contain an adequate 
description of the obligation with which the applicants 
had allegedly failed to comply;1
4. the notice contained no indication of the steps the 
seller intended to take i f  the demand was not complied 
with; it  re ferred  merely to a clause of the contract 
which re ferrrd  to a wide variety  of possible steps the 
seller could take. (These steps are not enumerated 
in the judgment but it  is difficult to contemplate how 
extensive the "wye verkeidenheid van moontlikke 
stappe"^ could really be (presumably they included 
cancellation, claims for damages or acceleration of 
payment).)
It is interesting to note tha t the Judge expressed doubts3 
as to whether the steps the seller intended to take and 
which appeared in the provisions of the contract could be 
incorporated into a notice merely by reference to it.
The Judge said:1*
"Die wetgewer het klaarblyklik bedoei dat die 
koper h geleentheid moet k ry  om ay kontrak- 
breuk te herste l. Indian nakoming van die 
betrokke verpligting dus vereis dat die koper "n 
bepaalde bedrag geld aan die verkoper moet 
betaat, en indien die koper nie redelikerwys kan 
weet wat die omvang van dear die bedrag is nie, 
volg dit myns insiens dat "n els om nakoming van
At 318.
At 320.
At 310.
At 319.
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die betrokke verpiigting ook moet vermeld wat die 
bedrag is wat die koper meet betaal. Indien die 
verpiigting wat 'n koper verstiim het om na te 
kotn, b v h  vaste maandelikse paaiement v ir to 
sekere maand is , mag dit voldoende wees om in 
die kennisgewing te eis dat die paaiement v ir die 
betrokke maand betaal word, sender vermelding 
van die bedrag van die paaiement, en wel omdat 
die bedrag daarvan aan die koper bekend is. 
Waar die bedrag egter nie vasstaan nie, soos die 
verskuldige balans in die onherhawige geval, sal 
die eis om betaling myns insiens slegs sin uitmaak 
indien die bedrag wat betaal moet word in die 
kennisgewing vermeld word."
That it  is not necessary for the seller to state in the notice 
when it commences to run had earlier been held by 
Kumleben J (with whom Van Heerden J concurred) in 
Robinson v  Bradfield. ^  He s&id:^
"He (the purchaser) was thus under a du ty  -  to 
my mind not an unreasonable one -  to find out 
from what date according to law the notice (which 
professed to be given in terms of the Sale of 
Land on Instalments Act 1971) ran ."
Kumleben J ,  referring  to the seller, continued:*
"He i*i not called upon to specify the actual 
commencement or expiry date (which incidentally 
would be an impraticable task inasmuch as the 
seller does not know on "'hat date the registered 
letter will be delivered) nor does the section 
enj'oin him to state in the lette r -  as It could 
easily have done -  that the th irty  days is to run
from the date of receipt or delivery of the
registered le t te r ."
The judgment in Miller v  HaU® followed shortly after that in
Robinson v Bradfield.6 In the former case the letter of
demand referred  to the alleged breach but incorrectly
1. 1984 (1) SA 349 (D).
2. At 352.
3. Words in brackets are mine.
4. Supra at 352-53.
T H E S l/ l /b s
851126(18)
PAGE 102
s tated that the notice waa being given in te rn s  of the 1071 
Act and clause 9 of the agreement of 3ale. It then 
continued:1
"As to the consequences attached to your 
non-compliance with the terms of this notice, your 
attention is drawn to the relevant clause in the 
agreement of sale, particularly the fact that 
should the seller elect to take legal action against 
you, all costs incurred thereby will be borne by
The firs t defence raised by the p u r c h a e w a a  that the 
notice did not comply with the provtr i of section 
19(2)(b) as i t  did not specify when the th irty  day period 
therein referred  to commenced to ru n . In the light of the 
judgment in Robinaon v Bradfield2 this point was abandoned 
by the purchaser's counsel, and Page J ,  who delivered the 
judgment of the Court, clearly accepted the latte r mentioned 
judgment as being correct. Tho court thereafter rejected 
the next defence that the notice was defective in that it 
purported to be given in terms of the 1971 Act instead of 
the 1981 Act which was applicable. It was not a 
requirement of the section, held the Judge, that there be 
any reference in the notice to the statu te in terms of which 
it was given. The incorrect reference was accordingly mere 
surplusage.
Clause 9 of the contract entitled the seller to :
1. Supra at 357.
2. Supra,
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(a) cancel the contract and claim a penalty; or
(b) cancel and claim damages! or
(c) claim acceleration if  the default was not remedied 
within th irty  days.
The purchaser contended that the notice did not comply 
with section 19(2)(c) as the seller had failed to specify 
exactly what steps the seller intended to take if  the default 
was not remedied. Counsel for the seller argued that the 
seller was required to do no more than indicate . tention 
to take any one of the steps se t forth in sections 
1 9 (l)(a ) , (b) or (c) without being obliged to say which he 
in fact intended to take.
Page J held that, no matter whose argument was correct the 
notice did not in any event comply with section 19(2) (c) 
because -
"even i f  the socond paragraph of the le tte r can 
be construed oa incorporating therein a reference 
to the remedies set forth in clause 9(a), (b) and
(c) of the contract, it  contains no indication of 
an intention on the part of the seller to enforce 
any of those remedies, either singularly or in the 
alternative. It certainly contains no express 
statement of such an intention; nor is such an 
intention, in my view, a justifiable implication 
Itom its terms. Those terms would be equally 
consistent, for instance, with an intention merely 
to enforce specific performance in respect of the 
arrea r instalments without resorting to any of the 
more drastic remedies provided for in clause 9."
1. Supra at 360. See also Oakley v  Bestconstructo (Pty) 
Limited supra.
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The learned Judge then held obiter* tha t the seller's 
argument was not correct. The object of section 19(2)(c) 
was, he held, to ensure that the purchaser knew precisely 
the consequences of a failure to remedy his broach so us to 
pu t him in a position to decide whether it  was in his best 
in terests to remedy or not; and that this object could be 
achieved only if  the purchaser knew exactly what remedy 
the seller intended to enforce i f  he persisted with his 
breach.
I t  was fu rthe r held that the letter did not comply with the 
provisions of section 19(2)(c) in that it  contained -
"no indication of an intention on the p a rt of the 
seller to enforce any o f those remedies (being 
those stated in the. contract) either singularly or 
in the alternative."
Page J in Miller v Hall  ^ said as follows:
" . . .  the seller must state in the notice which of 
the steps enumerated in s s . l  he intends to take."
In so doing, Page J approved similar views expressed by 
J M O tto.4
Argument had bean addressed to the court to the effect 
that the use of the words "steps" instead of "step" in the 
section meant that it  was permissible to indicate an intention
1. Supra at 361.
2. Supra at 360; (words in brackets are mine).
3. Supra at 364
4. "Aanmaninge by Afbetalingskoopkontrakte van 
Grond" June 1982 do Rebus 253 at 265.
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to take all the steps enumerated In section 119(1), aJbeit in 
the alternative. That this can be done is the view of Van 
Rensburg and Treisman, when they say :1
"It is submitted that in a notice given in terms of 
section 19, the seller may state alternative steps 
which he intends taking i f  his demand is not met, 
and that his options remain open until he finally 
decides which of the various remedies to pursue ."
Page J ,  however, was of a different view, saying:
"each of the courses enumerated in s s . ( l )  could 
comprise more than one step" ,
and accordingly that such an interpretation would:
"run  counter to th% intention of the provision, 
properly construed."
The judgment of Page J  which, although delivered prior to 
the publication of the book of the learned authors, 
appeared in the law reports only thereafter and is not 
referred to in the book. Obviously the learned authors 
were unaware of the judgment.
It is submitted that the view of the learned authors is 
preferable to that of Page J .  The object of the legislature 
has been said to afford reasonable protection to 
purchasers.^ Surely sufficient protection is afforded to the 
purchaser if  he is advised of the alternative remedies the 
seller may follow.
1. Op d t  at 204.
2. Supra at 365.
3. (Vessels JA in Maharaj’e case (supra).
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There are very  few oases on warning notices deaiing with 
the question whether the amount of the non-payment must 
actually be mentioned.
Chesterfield Investments (Pty) Limited v  Venter* dealt with 
a clause in a contract entitling the seller to cancel in the 
event of the purchaser failing to remedy a breach within a 
stated  period. The warning notice sent in this case 
referred  to the outstanding balance but did not state the 
amount thereof. The notice was held to be sufficient, the 
Court holding that there had been no suggestion that the 
purchaser could not ascertain the amount from the seller or 
from a statement of account which had been sent to him 
some four months earlier.
Porteous v  Strydom NO  ^ was a judgment of Qalgut AJ. In 
this case the demand required payment of:
"the sum of R16 109,U9 being the balance due and 
owing by you as at th is date in respect of 
increased building society in terest which you are 
liable to pay to our client under the provisions of 
the last sentence . . .  , This additional interest 
was due and payable in terms of the said 
agreement. We attach hereto a schedule showing 
how the interest claimed is arrived at."
The amount claimed in the above demand was incorrectly 
calculated and too high because of an incorrect calculation
1972 <SA) 19 (W). 
1984 (2) SA 489 (D).
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of in terest. It had been calculated as compound interest 
instead of simple in terest. However a schedule of the date 
and amounts of payments was attached to the notice.
Following the dicta of Goetzee J  in Hamid and another v 
Caasim,* the Judge held that care should be taken in 
interpreting and enforcing the provisions that a heavier 
onus was not put on the seller than had been intended by 
the legislature. In regard to the incorrect calculation of 
the amount in the notice, he said:^
"From the large amount itse lf that was 
claimed in the notice it  must have been 
clear to Jacobs (the purchaser) that the 
figure was far too high. It was clear 
from the schedule that it  waa compound 
in terest that had been calculated and 
demanded."
The judge held thet:
1. it  is not required by section 19(2) that the amount 
overdue is to be stated in the notice, although in 
given circumstances, such as in Oakley's case (where 
it  is  not a simple matter for the purchaser to
calculate i t ) ,  it may be necessary to state it  in order
to fulfil the requirement of section 19(2)(a). It ig
submitted that this is a correct interpretation of the 
judgment of Grosskopf J  in Oakley's  case;
2 , although, jj: the case in question, the seller had
named an amount which was wrong because it  was
1. Supra.
2. Supra at 497. Words in brackets are mine.
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based on a calculation of interest which, instead of 
being simple, had been compounded, there was
sufficient detail in the  notice, read with the schedule 
attached, to comply with section 19(2)(a); that is , it 
gave a sufficient description of the obligation which 
the purchaser had failed to fulfil;
3. in OakIe3r,s  case the notice was held to be invalid not 
merely because it failed to state the amount but
because it  was in other respects confusing and
unclear. It is submitted that this is also a correct 
interpretation of that judgment.
Is the seller bound by the intention he expresses in the 
notice or may he thereafter change hie mind?
In Walker v  Minier et Cie (Pty) Ltd1 the parties had
entered into a deed of sale which afforded the seller 
substantially the same remedies as wore in issue in Miller v 
Hall*, namely the right to cancell and claim forfeiture, or to 
cancel and recover damages, o r to enforce specific
performance. The purchaser was in breach of her
obligations to pay the full purchase price. The seller gave
her notice to do so within th irty  days in terms of the 1971
Act. Although it was not obligatory to do so in terms of 
th i t  A ct, the seller's attorneys stated in the letter that
1. 1979 (2) 8A 474 (W).
2. Supra.
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they hsd been instructed , in the event of failure to pay the 
outstanding balance,
"to proceed against you for payment of the same 
in terms of the aforesaid deed of sale,"
It was argued that the seller had elected, albeit In 
advance, to abide by the contract and to sue the purchaser 
for specific performance and that it  was bound by such 
election. Nestadt J  agreed with that argument but said 
that i f  attempts to enforce performance were unsuccessful 
the seller could change his mind and rescind and claim 
damages but that a fu rthe r th irty  day notice indicating his 
new intention was necessary.
The respondent in  Miller v  Hall1 had argued th a t, once 
having called on the purchaser to perform, the seller could 
never claim cancellation, o r , presumably, i f  having given an 
indication of an intention to cancel, could never have a 
change of mind and claim specific performance. This 
argument was rejected, the court holding that unless the 
expression of intention amounted to an election, i f  the seller 
wished to change h e r mind and adopt another remedy she 
merely had to give another notice. The Court said:"*
" . . .  intention may be expressed in such a way 
as to manifest and convey not merely the seller's 
state of mind but also simultaneously the overt
1. Supra.
2. Supra at 363.
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act of actually making the election . . .  It is, 
however, equally possible to express no more 
than an intention to make a specified overt act of 
election in the future; which is , in my view, all 
that the sub-section requires."
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION
From the above analysis of the cases I think it can fairly
be said that the present legal position in regard to section
19 is as follows:
1. The provisions thereof are peremptory and must be 
strictly  adhered to before a seller is entitled to
enforce his righ ts. The provisions of the section will 
be strictly  interpreted.^
2. If the notice referred to therein is conveyed by
registered post, the th irty  day period commences only 
upon receipt of the notice by the purchaser (or 
perhaps when i': is  made available to h im ).2 I t  is 
submitted that this is incorrect and that the correct 
position is  as stated in the Dynaland3 case and
(suggested perhaps?) in the Noordvaal  ^ case. The 
matter has been argued recently before the Appellate
1. See eg Maharaj v  Tongaat Development Corporation
(Pty) Limited 1976 (4) SA 994 (£ ) ;  Maron v 
Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 123 (W) and
Caldwell v  Savopoutos 1976~~(3) SA 741 (D).
2. See eg Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation
(Pty) Limited 1976 (4) SA 994 (A); Miller v  Hall 1 9#  
( I T S A W T d ) ;  Sher 8 v  Crookes T .E , 1984 (2) PH 
A64 (W); the only dTasent being oTSonovan J  in 
Dyn aland (Pty) Limited v U.B. Nielson (case 21432/81 
(W) unreported) and perhaps Gordon J in Noordvaal 
Konstruksie Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk v Booysei. 1979 
(2) SA 1937T).
3. Supra.
4. Supra.
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Division in the case of Orfrin___ en "n ander v
Phone-A-Copy Worldwide (Pty) L td. 1 Judgment has 
been reserved . This case refers to the original
Section 13 of the 1971 Act.
3. The amount required to be paid by the purchaser to 
rectify the breach must be stated unless the purchaser 
is  able from information accompanying the notice or 
other information (readily) available to him to easily
ascertain the details.^ This will apply equally if  the
breach is other than a failure to pay.
4. The seller can indicate an intention to take only one 
step if  the breach is not rectified. He cannot state 
alternative steps he will take .8 It has been suggested 
that this is not correct. 4 This view is preferable.
5. It is not necessary for the seller to state in the notice 
when the th irty  day period commences or ends. To do 
so would be impracticable.5
6. It is not necessary to state in the notice in terms o f 
which statu te it  is being given.8
1. Presently reported as 1983 (3) SA 881 (T ).
2. See Porteous v Strydom NO 1984 (2) SA 489 (D) and 
Oakley v Bestconstructo (Pty) Limited 1983 (4) SA 312TfTT*
3. See Miller v  Hall supra.
4. See Van Rensburg and Treisman -  op cit at 204.
5. See Robinson v Bradfield supra.
6. See Miller v Hall supra.
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7. The indication by a seller of the steps he intends to 
take does not necessarily amount to his making" an 
election, bu t, i f  he changes his intention, a further 
th irty  day notice indicating the change is required 
before he can enforce his righ ts. However, once he 
makes an election, he will not be permitted to change 
his mind.1
8. If post is used as the means for conveying the 
notice
8.1 registered post must be used. Certified poet will 
not suffice even i f  the notice is received by the 
addressee.^
8.2 the lette r must be sent to the chosen domicilium 
or may be altered by notice sent per registered 
post. Alteration in any other manner is 
ineffective.3
9. It is doubtful whether the steps intended to be taken 
can be incorporated in the notice by reference to 
another document.*
1. See Miller v Hall; Walker v Minier et Cle (Pty) Ltd 
supra.
2. See Caldwell <f Savopoulos supra,
3. Noordvaal Konstruksie Muatokappy (Edma) 3pk v 
Booysen supra.
4. See Oakley v Bestconstructo (Pty) Limited and Miller v 
Hall (obiter) supra.
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It is submitted that the judgment of the Appellate Division 
in Maharaj's case was wrong, but that even if  it  was 
correct, the present wording of section IB renders it  no 
longer applicable1 and that the cases which followed the 
judgment after the amendment of section 13 and the 
enactment of section i9 failed to appreciate the significance 
of the amendments.
It is a pity that in their interpretation of section 13 of the 
1971 Act and section 19 of the 1981 Act the Courts have not 
shown the caution so often stated by them to be necessary 
in the Interpretation of a provision, such as the  one under 
consideration, to prevent imposing on a seller a greater 
burden than was intended by the legislature.2
Many years ago, in Kent. N.O. v  South African Railways 
and Another** Watermeyer CJ quoted with approval the 
following statement in Craiea4:
"In Re Cvno, Bowen LJ aaid
'in the construction of statutes you must not 
construe the words so as to take away righ tr 
which already existed before the Statute 
was passed, unless you have plain words 
which indicate that such was the intention of 
the legislature1."
1. Per O'Donovan J  in Dynalond (Pty) Limited v  U.S.
Nielsen and Gordon " u  In Noordvaal Konstruksie 
Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk v  Booysen supra.
2. Sec for example Grosskopf J in Oakley v
Bestconstruoto (Pty) Limited; Coetzie J  in Hamid and
another v Cassim 1978 (2) SA 102 (T).
3„ 1946 AD 398 at 405.
4. Statute Law (4th ed) at 111.
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Although this was a reference to rights which existed under 
a previous sta tu te , the same principle applies to rights 
which exist at common law. That this is so wss stated by 
Davis JA in Wellworths Bazaars v Chandlers1 Ltd and 
another, 1 which related to the righ ts of a lessor.
The Judge said:
"Nor must it be overlooked that, as has been said 
by this Court in Herison v  S.A. Mutual Life 
Assurance Society (1942 (AD) 259 at 263) the 
provisions of met'sures of this type ’constitute a 
drastic interference with the common law rights of 
lessors'. Such rig,Ms are not to be held to have 
been taken away save by express words or by 
necessary implication . . .  Here neither are there 
express words nor any necessary implication. 
Consequently there is no ground for reading into 
Reg 4 any fu rth e r inroad on the rights of the 
lessor than those actually contained therein . . . "
Similar sentiments were expressed by the full bench of the
Transvaal Provincial Division in Hamid and another v
Caasim3 by Coetzee J  (with whom Lq Grange J concurred).
The following was the view of the court in regard to section
13 of the 1971 Act:
"One must not overlook that provisions of this 
type constitute a drastic interference with the 
contractual rights of sellers which should not be 
held to have been taken n v ':  save by  exprsss 
words or necessary implicati. vr'. Here there are 
neither express words nor there any necessary 
implication."
It is submitted that neither the express words nor 
necessary implications referred  to by Davis JA and
1947 (2) SA 37 (A). 
At 43.
Supra at 105.
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Coetzee J are present in regard to section 19. There was 
no reason whatsoever to depart from the plain and ordinary 
meaning o f  the words used in that section in order to give 
effect to it.
What is the position of the seller who cannot deliver the 
notice by hand to the purchaser who resides at an address 
other than th a t chosen as his domictiium, or has chosen a 
domioilium at which he will never receive the notice if  it is 
despatched by registered post? According to the law as it 
now stands, his righ ts pf action will not be limited, as the 
heading to secton 19 states; they will have been frustrated 
en tire ly .1
As the law now stands, delivery of a notice by hand to a 
purchaser is acceptable irrespective of where such delivery 
is effected. If, however, the post is used as a means of 
conveying the notice, it  must be directed to the chosen 
domicilium notwithstanding that the purchaser may never 
receive it; and i such event the seller would be without a 
remedy. If the purchaser receives a notice through the 
post at any other address it is ineffective irrespective of 
whether i t  was conveyed by registered poet or not. The 
notice is likewise ineffective if  the purchaser receives it, 
even at the chosen domicilium, unless it  has been conveyed
I .  Unless one adopts, in such circumsancea, a different 
interpretation of the Section as was suggested by HCJ 
Flemming op cit and Theo de Jager op c it.
T H B S l/l/b s
851126(18)
PAGE 117
b y  registered post. It can surely be seen that this state 
of affairs is completely illogical.
Flemming J  in Holme's* case was well aware of the difficuty 
his judgment would create for sellers. He mentioned 
various reaoons why delivery of the demand to the 
purchaser ma$ be impossible. He was also aware that there 
might be circumstances where it  is practically or absolutely 
impossible for the seller to cause the registered letter to 
actually rea th  the pu rchaser.2 He said :3
"The difficulty of practical o r even absolute 
impossibility arose in  regard to legislative 
provisions similar to s!9 and preceding s!9. The 
Legislature would surely have been aware of the 
seller's problems. The Legislature would have 
been aware thereof and the Court cannot by 
construction legislate. It would probably have 
realised that there is little to no room (there 
appearing to be no room to claim that lex  non 
cogit ad impossibilia) for invoking common law 
principles to override what Parliament spells out. 
Nevertheless no comfort was explicitly derived for 
the s^Mer who has attempted all that could be 
reaso. i-bly expected of him. The absence of an 
equitab" safety valve, i f  tha t is the case, tends 
to a tr.-  ti hen the argument that the legislature, 
in fairuvdS towards the seller, would have 
intended that the posting of a demand is 
adequate. The weight of that consideration is 
lessened by the fact that the legislature had a 
basic u h o i .b e te e n  unfairness towards the seller 
. . .  and unfairness . . .  o f a purchaser finding his 
contract cancelled because the letter was not 
delivered."
It is submitted that there is  a safety valve in thax in terms 
of the section as presently drafted , receipt of the notice is
1. Supra at 430-31.
2. At 431.
3. At 431.
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not neceaary if it  is  sent by registered post. That is the 
whole purpose of the legislature prescribing this method of 
posting. Even Weasels JA in Maharaj's1 ease appreciated 
that the choice of this method was significant. It is
submitted that the present unsatisfactory situation arose 
because the courts commenced with the hypothesis that the 
purchaser must receive the notice, whatever mode of
transmission was used, and in order to ju stify  this 
argument were obliged to in terpret "sent" as meaning
"received".
The purpose of the legislature in requiring notices to be 
directed to the domicilium citandi et executandi instead of 
the last known business or residential address and 
requiring that they be sent by registered post is two-fold. 
Firstly it  ensures that the address to which they are sent 
is  within the control of the purchaser (who should, bearing 
in mind the importance of the notices, make sure that it  Is 
an address a t which he will receive them) and secondly it 
uses a method of conveyance which is  usually reliable.
Having regard  to tU  aforegoing, which provides reasonable 
protection for the , na'jhaser, the legislature was prepared 
to grant the sellet -vue relief by providing that the th irty  
day period comme,.i :i  on the date the notice is sent by 
regioterd post to iVj, address. The words "calculated from" 
were, it  is suv-.ii ed, specifically introduced into the
1. Supra.
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statute to meet the difficulty raised by the judgment of 
Wessels JA in Maharaj's* case, o f which the legislature must 
have been aware.2
I t  could never have been intended that a seller could ever 
find himself in a position where he could not enforce his 
rights simply because he could not deliver a notice to the 
purchaser.
Contracts often contain a provision to the effect that all 
notices given in terms thereof are deemed to have been 
received within a stated period after posting. Could this 
be the answer? I submit that it  would not. Such a clause 
would amount to a waiver of the purchaser's righ ts to 
receive the notice, and in view of the peremptory 
provisions of section 19 and the provisions of section 29 
prohibiting a waiver by the purchaser of any rights 
conferred upon him by the 1981 Act, it  is doubtful that 
such a provision would be valid.
Hopefully the arguments set forth herein will enable 
someone to persuade a court that the decisi.n of the 
Appellate Division in Maharaj's case no longer applies. 
Certainly, sellers of land on instalments would welcome th is.
1. Supra.
2. Leyds NO v. Noord-westelike Kooperatlewe 
LanBboumaatskappy Bpk en Andere supra.
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